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III. INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Neil R. 
Mitchell ("Mr. Mitchell") responds to issues raised in the brief 
of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Lynda Wood ("Ms. Wood"). 
The facts relevant to this Reply Brief are set forth in Part 
VIII of Mr. Mitchell's principal brief and are incorporated 
herein by this reference. For consistency and convenience, the 
same abbreviations are used in both briefs. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MARGE'S ESTATE IS LIABLE FOR THE RETURN OF THE ESTATE FUNDS 
As set forth in Appellant's principal brief, Marge's sole 
right and responsibility under the clear, express terms of 
Grant's Will was to fund the Trust. She admittedly failed to do 
this. The Trial Court therefore found that Marge breached her 
fiduciary duty as personal representative. Her only right of 
access to those funds was through the Trust. Because she 
converted the Estate Funds in contravention of the express terms 
of the Will, this Court need look no further in determining that 
Marge's estate is liable for the return of both components of the 
Estate Funds—the Estate Cash Deficiency and the Checking Account 
Payments. 
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A. Mr. Mitchell Is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law 
on the Estate Cash Deficiency in the Amount of 
$52/875.40, as that Amount was Properly Before the 
Trial Court. 
The Trial Court erred in concluding that Mr. Mitchell did 
not dispute Ms. Wood's allegation that the Estate Cash Deficiency 
was only $48,100.00, and Ms. Wood's reliance upon that argument 
in her brief is similarly misplaced. As Mr. Mitchell argues in 
his principal brief, he clearly disputed Ms. Wood's figure in the 
statement of facts supporting his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
There, he set forth the amount of $52,875.40 as the undisputed 
amount of the Estate Cash Deficiency, based on the Affidavit of 
Scott Livingston, an accountant with the firm of Grant Thornton. 
He also disputed the basis for Ms. Wood's figure in his 
memorandum opposing her motion. R. 259, 352, 415. The amount of 
$52,875.40 was the only figure properly before the Trial Court 
pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P. The Trial Court should 
have adopted that figure as the correct amount of the Estate Cash 
Deficiency. 
Ms. Wood argues that Marge need only return $48,100.00 of 
the Estate Cash Deficiency. The difference—$4,775.40—is 
supposedly comprised of $1,900.00 in personal representative fees 
and $2,875.40 in interest on the $50,000.00 Certificate of 
Deposit Marge converted. Marge, however, was not entitled to 
either interest or fees. 
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Marge was not entitled to take a fee for her services as 
personal representative. The $1,900.00 figure is arbitrary and 
unsupported. There is no evidence that Marge ever submitted a 
petition for compensation or ever received court authorization to 
receive compensation, as required by Utah Code Ann., § 75-3-718. 
Further, because Marge admittedly breached her fiduciary duty as 
personal representative, she would not have been entitled to a 
fee for acting as such. 
Marge was only entitled to the income from the Trust which 
she never formed. She was not entitled to anything from the 
Estate directly. To the extent she claims any amount as income 
in addition to her support, she is making a claim in excess of 
even her interpretation of Grant's Will. Additionally, there is 
nothing in the record to support the $2,875.40 claimed by Ms. 
Wood as interest on the Certificate of Deposit that Marge 
converted. Her accounting is simply incorrect. 
This Court should direct entry of judgment as a matter of 
law in the amount of $52,875.40 as the Estate Cash Deficiency. 
B. Marge Was Not Entitled to the Checking Account Payments 
in the Amount of $96,642.00, nor any Other funds from 
the Estate. 
Ms. Wood argues that even though Marge admittedly breached 
her fiduciary duty under the Will, her breach was not actionable 
because (1) Grant's Estate was not damaged, and (2) Marge would 
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have been entitled to the money anyway had the Trust been funded. 
In the event the Court reaches this issue, it cannot adopt 
Ms. Wood's position. The Estate has been damaged by Marge's 
breach and conversion. As set forth more fully in Mr. Mitchell's 
principal brief, the express terms and structure of the Will 
demonstrate that Marge would not have been entitled to the money 
because she had ample resources of her own. Because Marge was 
not entitled to the Checking Account Payments, or any other funds 
from the Estate, as the following points illustrate, such funds 
would have remained in the Estate. 
1. The "As Is Necessary" Clause in the Will Evidences 
Grant's Intent that Marge Not Receive Principal of 
the Trust Unless Her Own Resources Were 
Insufficient. 
The Will instructed Marge to establish the Trust, appointing 
Marge and Mr. Mitchell as co-trustees. The co-trustees were only 
authorized to distribute "as much of the principal as is neces-
sary for [Marge's] proper health, support, and maintenance and to 
maintain her in the standard of living that she enjoyed during 
[Grant's] lifetime." R. 62-63. Ms. Wood suggests that this 
clause created a duty on the part of Mr. Mitchell to disburse 
Trust principal to Marge to support her lifestyle. She argues 
that the phrase "as is necessary" referred to how much 
Mr. Mitchell should pay her, not whether he should invade the 
principal, regardless of Marge's independent resources. 
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The Will, in reality, created the opposite duty for 
Mr. Mitchell. The "as is necessary" clause placed a duty upon 
Mr. Mitchell, as co-trustee, to consider Marge's own resources 
before invading the principal of the Trust on her behalf. 
Because of his fiduciary obligation as a co-trustee, he would not 
have been entitled to invade the principal as long as Marge had 
sufficient independent resources to pay for her maintenance and 
support herself.1 
a. Case Law Supports Mr. Mitchell's Position. 
Although this is an issue of first impression before this 
Court, several jurisdictions have analyzed similar testamentary 
language with similar facts and held that a trustee cannot invade 
principal if (1) the gift of principal is "conditioned upon need" 
and (2) the life beneficiary has sufficient independent 
resources. 
On pages 32 and 33 of her brief, Ms. Wood cites her own affidavit 
testimony that Marge's expenditures of the Estate Funds were ^reasonable," as 
conclusive support for her argument that Marge was entitled to the converted 
Estate Funds. Ms. Wood's testimony is not relevant as to whether or not the 
expenditures were "reasonable" for purposes of disbursements from the Trust 
because she was not one of the co-trustees. Whether a disbursement was 
"reasonable" or "necessary" was left to the discretion of the co-trustees. 
Ms. Woodfs opinion on this issue, therefore, carries no weight. 
The only salient opinion as to whether Marge's expenditures were 
reasonable, is that of Mr. Mitchell, the other co-trustee. Ms. Wood argues 
that it is speculative for Mr. Mitchell to assert that he would have denied 
the disbursements had Marge even sought his approval. The fact that Mr. 
Mitchell has pursued this litigation, however, is ample evidence that, had the 
Trust been established, he would have opposed disbursements of Trust 
principal. 
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Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950) is a well-
reasoned and well-supported decision on this issue. There, the 
Colorado Supreme Court analyzed testamentary language and facts 
similar to the present case and concluded that the beneficiary 
did not have a right to principal of the trust because of his 
abundant independent resources. The will provided: 
Upon my death, provided Dr. George K. Dunklee of San 
Luis Obispo, California, is then living, that said 
trustee pay the entire income of my estate to him 
during his lifetime. I further authorize my said 
trustee to use as much of the principal of my estate, 
in addition to said income, as may be necessary to 
provide him with the necessities of life. 
Id. at 853. The remainder beneficiaries argued and offered proof 
that Dr. Dunklee enjoyed a large income from his private clinic, 
as well as other investment income sources, that his personal 
resources were more than sufficient for his support, and that he 
could demonstrate no "need" that would warrant an invasion of the 
principal of the trust. 
The court concluded that "the language used by the testatrix 
seems to us to be clear, understandable and unambiguous, and that 
she intended that Dr. Dunklee was to receive only the income from 
her estate unless it became necessary to use the principal to 
provide him with the necessities of life." Id. at 854-55. 
Because Dr. Dunklee's assets were so numerous, the court held 
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that it was inappropriate for the trustee to invade the principal 
of the Trust. 
The present case is similar. The testamentary gift of 
principal was conditioned upon Marge's "need." It is undisputed 
that Marge was worth over one-half million dollars at the time of 
Grant's death and that she did not need Grant's principal to pay 
for her support, maintenance, and lifestyle. In addition to 
being entitled to the income from the Trust, her other 
independent resources were more than ample. Because no need 
existed, it would have been improper for her to invade the 
principal. 
The Dunklee court relies upon and carefully analyzes several 
similar cases where courts prohibited invasions of principal, or 
at least required the trustees to examine the life beneficiaries' 
independent resources.2 
See In re Martin's Will, 199 N.E. 491, 492 (N.Y. 1936)("the private 
income of the beneficiary must be considered in determining whether such need 
exists"); In re Seacnst' s Estate, 66 A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. 1949) ("To know the 
quality and quantity of [the beneficiary's] private estate becomes very 
material in order to determine his good faith and his necessities."); Board of 
Visitors v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company, 46 A.2d 280 (Md. Ct. App. 1946) 
("circumstances and income of the beneficiary should be taken into 
consideration in determining whether to invade the principal of the trust."); 
Bridgeport City Trust Company v. Beech, 174 A. 308 (Conn. 1934) (holding under 
similar circumstances and testamentary language that, without a showing of 
need, principal may not be invaded.); Hull v. Holloway, 20 A. 445, 447 (Conn. 
1889)("So long as [the husband] is able to support himself . . ., the trustee 
has no right to pay over to him, . . ., any portion of the income or principal 
of the trust fund."); Stemple v. Middletown Trust Company, 15 A.2d 305 (Conn. 
1940) ("[beneficiary's] personal estate, . . . is to be taken into account by 
the trustees in future payments to her."). Copies of these supporting cases 
are attached in the Addendum of Mr. Mitchell's principal brief. 
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After Dunklee, several jurisdictions have analyzed this 
issue and rendered similar decisions. For example, in Sibson v. 
First National Bank & Trust Company, 165 A.2d 800 (N.J. Supp. Ct. 
I960),3 the will provided that the trustee pay to the decedent's 
wife "as much of the principal as my trustee in its sole 
discretion shall determine necessary for her support, health and 
maintenance/' As in the present case, the decedent had no 
children of his own and the remainder beneficiaries under the 
trust were his brother and sister and their children. Based on 
the implied intention to benefit the remainder beneficiaries with 
some portion of the trust, the court concluded: 
"[W]here the life tenant is given the income of the trust, 
with a further provision authorizing the trustee to invade 
corpus if necessary for the life tenant's support, the 
separate income of the life tenant must be considered in 
determining whether it is necessary to invade corpus." 
Id. at 803. Because the life beneficiary under the trust had 
sufficient assets of her own, distributions of trust principal 
"could result in plaintiff's amassing a large estate for her own 
testamentary purposes, more or less at the expense of decedent's 
estate and the remaindermen named in decedent's will. Clearly 
this is contrary to the testamentary plan expressed by decedent." 
Id. Similarly, Marge's actions in the present case also created 
A copy of Sibson, as well as the other cases discussed in this section, 
are attached in the Addendum to this Reply Brief. 
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a situation that was "clearly contrary" to Grant's testamentary 
plan. See pp. 32-33 of Mr. Mitchell's principal brief. 
In Security-People's Trust Company v. United States, 238 F. 
Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa. 1965), the testator authorized the trustee "to 
advance portions of the principal of the trust estate to or for 
use or benefit of the following beneficiaries . . . at such 
times, in such amounts, and for such purposes as my trustee in 
its discretion may deem advisable." The trust then provided for 
distribution to remainder beneficiaries upon the death of the 
testator's wife, the life beneficiary. The court found that the 
trustee was familiar with the extent of the wife's estate, which 
was approximately five times the size of the testamentary estate. 
In light of the abundance of the wife's separate assets, the 
court concluded: 
Since there are a series of further life beneficiaries and 
remaindermen, the trustee would be under a strong duty to 
protect their interests in the face of any request of the 
[wife] for invasion. Under the Pennsylvania decisions, a 
court would be bound to look into the assets of her own 
estate, which were well known to the trustee, who managed 
them. 
Id. at 49 (emphasis added). The court then held that the size of 
her estate, alone, would not only "compel the trustee to resist 
her request for invasion except for clear necessity, but it would 
also guide the court in any attempt to determine the testator's 
intent." The testator was familiar with his wife's assets, and 
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it became clear to the court that the testator's intent was to 
benefit the remainder beneficiaries and only provide for his wife 
should her personal assets be insufficient.4 
Similarly, in the present case, Grant knew of his wife's 
resources. It should likewise be clear to this Court that based 
on the size of Marge's own estate, Grant only intended for her to 
have access to his money should her independent resources be 
insufficient. 
In N.C.N.B. National Bank of Florida v. Shanaberger, 616 
So.2d 96 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993), the trust in question named Mark 
Shanaberger as the income beneficiary. Upon his death, two 
remainder trusts were to be created for the benefit of the 
trustor's nieces. The Will instructed the trustee to "invade the 
principal of the trust estate and pay from the said principal so 
much of it as in the sole discretion of the trustee is necessary 
for the care and maintenance, support and medical attention of 
Mark Shanaberger." Id. at 97. The parties stipulated that the 
settlor and Mr. Shanaberger had full knowledge of each other's 
respective financial situation and that the settlor knew that 
Shanaberger's assets and "income exceeded her own and were 
sufficient to meet his anticipated medical costs and expenses 
The Security-People's Trust case cites several Pennsylvania cases for 
the same proposition. 
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without contribution from her trust funds." Id. The court 
determined that the trustee was accountable to the remaindermen. 
In order to fulfill that fiduciary obligation, the trustee was 
required to look at the life beneficiary's own assets to 
determine whether there was a need to invade the principal. 
Likewise, in the present case, Mr. Mitchell would have been under 
a similar duty to the Trust, and any invasion of principal would 
have been a breach of that duty. 
In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1969) is a seminal 
case. There, the will established a trust for the benefit of the 
decedent's widow for life, and for the benefit of the couple's 
children, as remainder beneficiaries. The trust provided that 
the income be used directly for the widow's benefit and that, "if 
such income be insufficient for the support and maintenance of 
Elsie, my trustee shall so pay or use from principal sufficient 
monies to provide for Elsie's support and maintenance, in the 
sole, absolute and uncontrolled discretion of the trustee." Id. 
at 719 (emphasis added). In construing this provision, Chief 
Judge Fuld determined that even though the trustee had absolute 
and sole discretion, the testamentary gift of principal was 
conditioned upon the widow's need. Accordingly, the trustee was 
entitled to take into account the widow's private resources 
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before making an invasion of principal. Specifically, the court 
stated: 
The principle which emerges from the case may be 
briefly stated. A trustee, particularly when given 
uncontrolled discretion to invade principal . . ., may, 
before deciding to effect an invasion, take into 
account the beneficiary's independent resources where 
there is no "absolute" gift of principal, the prime 
gift being that of income, and the testator intended 
that the invasion of the principal be dependent upon 
the needs or requirements of the beneficiary. 
Id. at 720. 
In the present case, had Mr. Mitchell been informed of 
Marge's desire to invade the principal, he would have been 
required to look at Marge's independent resources in order to 
fulfill his fiduciary obligation to the Trust. He would have 
found ample liquid assets and, as such, would have been 
constrained to avoid depletion of the principal. 
b. Case Law Refutes Ms. Wood's Argument. 
In addition to showing that Marge was not entitled to the 
Estate Funds, these cases bring to light two additional points 
that counter Ms. Wood's arguments. First, several of the wills 
analyzed in the above-cited cases state that the trustee "shall" 
distribute principal to the beneficiary as is necessary. See 
e.g., In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d at 720; Hull v. Holloway, 
20 A. at 447; Stemple v. Middletown Trust Co., 15 A.2d at 307. 
In spite of Ms. Wood's argument to the contrary, whether the will 
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says the trustee "shall" or "may" distribute principal appears to 
be an insignificant point in those cases. If a will says "shall 
distribute", but that directive is then qualified by the phrase 
"as is necessary," the beneficiary is not entitled to principal 
disbursements unless a "need" truly exists because the benefi-
ciary's own resources are insufficient. 
Second, Ms. Wood argues that the "as is necessary" language 
only places a qualification on the amount of the distribution, 
not whether such distribution is appropriate. The wills in 
Stemple, Sibson v. First National Bank & Trust Co., and N.C.N.B. 
Bank v. Shanaberger instructed their trustees to "pay so much of 
the principal as is necessary . . . " —similar to the 
instructions in Grant's Will. Contrary to Ms. Wood's contention, 
however, the courts in those cases indicated that the testa-
mentary language placed a condition on whether the trustee should 
make a distribution, not how much the distribution should be. 
Finally, the cases cited by Ms. Wood in support of her 
position are factually distinguishable from the present case. In 
First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224 (Wyo. 
1966), for example, the life beneficiary of the trust had limited 
assets. Her husband died in 1936, and the case was brought in 
1960. If her own assets were not depleted by then, they were 
likely nearly gone, in spite of her remarriage. In In re 
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Lindgren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994) and Godfrey v. Chandley, 811 
P.2d 1248 (Kan. 1991), both life beneficiaries were alive, living 
in nursing homes, and legally incompetent or suffering from 
Alzheimer's. In Lindgren, the Will expressly stated that the 
purpose of the testamentary trust was to "provide for and assure 
so far as possible, the generous care and support of the 
beneficiary during her lifetime." Because of Mrs. Lindgren's 
financial condition, her conservator was required to pay for her 
nursing home care out of the conservator's own pocket, and the 
action was brought mainly to recover the conservator's losses. 
885 P.2d at 1281. In Godfrey, the grantor devised substantially 
all of his property to the life beneficiary. 811 P.2d at 1250. 
These are very different factual settings than those of the 
present case. Marge was neither destitute nor in a nursing home 
at the time of Grant's death. Nothing in the express terms of 
the Will evidence an intent that Marge have unrestricted use of 
the principal. She enjoyed her own estate of over one-half 
million dollars which continued to grow as she helped herself to 
the resources of Grant's Estate. The life beneficiaries in 
Finkbiner, Lindgren, and Godfrey were all destitute, or nearly 
destitute, widows who had little or no means to support 
themselves, other than with their late husbands' money. Here, 
even though Marge was advanced in years, her own personal wealth 
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would have precluded her inappropriate invasions of the Estate 
Funds. 
2. The Will, as Supplemented by Surrounding 
Circumstances, is Sufficient to Ascertain Grant's 
Intent, 
Based on the foregoing arguments and cases, it is 
Mr. Mitchell's position that the Will clearly expresses Grant's 
intent that Marge only receive Trust principal if her ample 
independent resources were insufficient for her support. If, 
however, the Court finds an ambiguity as to the interpretation of 
this clause, it is entitled
 #to look beyond the "four corners" of 
the Will for guidance. In fact, Finkbiner, cited by Ms. Wood, as 
well as other cases, instructs courts in such situations to look 
to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will in 
order to ascertain testamentary intent. 416 P.2d at 228/ See 
also. In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d at 720. 
The record of "surrounding circumstances" in this case is 
relatively sparse, as the matter was summarily decided below. To 
the extent surrounding circumstances are in the record, they 
support Mr. Mitchell's position. For example, Marge had ample 
assets of her own, and the couple was advanced in years at the 
time of the execution of the Will. Marge clearly did not need 
Grant's money. She could easily pay her own expenses with her 
own money. 
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The record of surrounding circumstances, on the other hand, 
does not support Ms. Wood's contentions. The "facts" in 
Ms. Wood's brief are either not in the record or are misrepre-
sented. For example, Ms. Wood repeatedly asserts that Marge was 
bedridden and therefore Grant intended her to have free reign of 
the Estate Funds. This however, is a mischaracterization of 
Ms. Wood's own affidavit testimony. Ms. Wood's Affidavit does 
not indicate that Marge was bedridden at the time Grant executed 
his Will, which is the critical time for determining his testa-
mentary intent. Further, Ms. Wood testifies that "[a] few months 
after Grant's death, [Marge] discontinued the night nursing 
care," which implies that Marge was not confined to her bed or in 
need of such assistance. R. 406-408. Marge's subsequent 
physical condition has not been accurately defined by Ms. Wood's 
Affidavit, cannot be considered in ascertaining testamentary 
intent, and should not be used to play on the sympathies of the 
Court. Marge was represented by counsel at the time, and there 
is no evidence that she was not in full control of her faculties. 
Ms. Wood also incorrectly asserts on pages 20 and 21 of her 
brief that if Marge had to use her own resources instead of 
converting the Estate Funds, she would have been required to sell 
her home in order to do so. This is patently untrue. The record 
reflects that at the time of Grant's death, Marge had over 
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$150,000.00 in cash and $286,500.00 held in certificates of 
deposit. See Ms. Wood's Answers to Interrogatories, R.281-83. 
Marge would have been required to spend over $400,000.00 of her 
net worth of $515,455.21 before depleting her liquid assets. 
Ms. Wood's affidavit does not address many relevant 
surrounding circumstances and distorts some facts that are 
addressed, such as gifts made by Marge. Even considering Ms. 
Wood's Affidavit, the present record does not support her 
position.5 While Mr. Mitchell believes Grant's intent is clearly 
expressed in the Will, if this Court determines that the record 
should be augmented to more fully elucidate Grant's intent, the 
matter should be remanded to the Trial Court for further factual 
determination. 
3. Grant's Estate Planning Strategies Were Intended 
to Benefit the Remainder Beneficiaries/ Not Marge. 
As Ms. Wood concedes in her brief, Grant's design in creat-
ing the Trust was to reduce exposure to estate tax liability. 
However, Ms. Wood attempts to argue that Grant's tax planning was 
designed to benefit Marge, not the remainder beneficiaries, and 
The affidavit of John McCoy, upon which Ms. Wood relied below and now 
relies in her brief, should also be disregarded or given little weight. 
Mr. McCoy attempts to establish Grant's testamentary intent through inadmis-
sible hearsay as to statements Grant made at or near the time he executed his 
Will. See Rules 801, 802, Utah R. Evid. Additionally, Mr. McCoy, as counsel 
for Ms. Wood, is not permitted to testify in this proceeding. See Rule 3.7, 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
This issue was raised below in Mr. Mitchell's Memorandum in opposition 
to Ms. Wood's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 412-17. 
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that Grant intended her to have unrestricted access to the Estate 
Funds, In fact on pages 28 and 29 of her brief, Ms. Wood argues 
that XNGrant's Will makes perfectly clear that these intentions 
[to avoid excessive estate taxation] superseded any desire to 
preserve the Estate for residuary beneficiaries." 
Ms. Wood's arguments, however, do not make sense for two 
reasons. First, there is absolutely no tax benefit that could 
have been conferred on Marge by virtue of the Trust. Had Grant 
intended for her to have unlimited access to his assets, he could 
have left his entire Estate to her, tax free. See 26 U.S.C. § 
2650. The tax benefits intended, therefore, could only have been 
intended for the remainder beneficiaries. 
Second, in order to realize such a tax benefit to the 
remainder beneficiaries of the surviving spouse, Marge needed to 
fund the Trust so that her access to the principal of the Trust 
was restricted. An individual may create a trust whereby his 
estate will be placed in trust for the benefit of his surviving 
spouse for life, to then be distributed to remainder benefici-
aries upon the death of the survivor. As long as the principal 
is only distributed to the life beneficiary pursuant to the 
restrictions in the trust, the trust will not be taxed in the 
survivor's estate. See 26 U.S.C. § 2041 (b) (1) (A) . 
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By failing to fund the Trust, Marge risked destroying 
Grant's tax planning. In light of this risk, the Trial Court's 
ruling is contrary to public policy. If this Court were to 
affirm that ruling, it would establish precedent in this state, 
allowing personal representatives to ignore testators' intent 
regardless of the potential tax consequences to others. 
C. Mr. Mitchell's Estoppel Argument Is Appropriately 
Before this Court. 
In his principal memorandum, Mr. Mitchell argues that 
Ms. Wood and Marge's estate should be equitably estopped from 
denying liability for the missing Estate Funds, particularly in 
light of Marge's shortcomings as personal representative. 
Ms. Wood, however, claims that this argument is inappropriate 
because it was not raised below. Mr. Mitchell acknowledges the 
rule that an appellant cannot raise new issues on appeal. This, 
however, is not a new issue. It is simply a new argument. The 
issue remains the same as in the Trial Court: Did Marge breach 
her fiduciary duty and is her estate now liable for the return of 
the Estate Funds because of that breach? This new estoppel 
argument simply proposes another reason why Marge's estate cannot 
escape liability. Marge's disregard for her duty and the fact 
that her revision of her own will thwarted Grant's estate plan-
ning, are examples of inequitable conduct that should preclude 
Ms. Wood's attempt to avoid liability. 
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POINT II 
MS. WOOD IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN HER 
CROSS APPEAL 
A, The Personal Injury Settlement Proceeds Are Property of 
Grant's Estate. 
Marge was not entitled to the proceeds of the settlement of 
Grant's personal injury action, as Ms. Wood argues in her cross-
appeal. According to Utah's Survival Statute, Utah Code Ann., § 
78-11-12 (b), the settlement proceeds belong to Grant's Estate. 
That statute reads: 
If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies 
as a result of a cause other than the injury received as a 
result of the wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, 
the personal representative or heirs of that person are 
entitled to receive no more than the out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred by or on behalf of that injured person as the 
result of his injury. 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the proceeds of such a settlement would 
go to the personal representative of the estate, if the plaintiff 
died with a valid will, or to the intestate heirs if the 
plaintiff died without a will. 
Grant died before resolution of the lawsuit. After his 
death, his Estate settled the claim for $12,445.86. Grant had 
his Will and did not die intestate. Therefore, according to the 
statute, the proceeds of the settlement were to go to Marge in 
her capacity as personal representative of the Estate, and not in 
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her individual capacity. Her duty, which she failed to execute, 
was to place the proceeds of the settlement into the Estate where 
they could be applied to the purposes and in the manner 
prescribed by the Will. Because she converted those proceeds in 
contravention of that duty, her estate is liable for the return 
of $12,445.86.6 
Ms. Wood's reliance on In re Behm's Estate/ 213 P.2d 657 
(Utah 1950) is misplaced because Behm/ as well as the other cases 
she cites, dealt with a cause of action for wrongful death, not a 
personal injury settlement. The policy considerations as to who 
owns a cause of action are very different between wrongful death 
and personal injury claims. As Judge Hanson clearly and 
correctly articulated at the hearing on the Motions for Summary 
Judgment below, in a wrongful death action, the heirs of the 
decedent personally hold claims for loss of consortium, lost 
support, and other personal losses. See In re Estate of Haro, 
887 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In a personal injury case, on 
the other hand, the only party that has a claim for damages is 
the injured person-- "not their spouse or their children or 
anybody else." Transcript of Oral Argument, R. 563-64. 
g 
Marge was not entitled to the settlement proceeds as Grant's "only 
surviving intestate heir," as Ms. Wood argues, because Grant did not die 
"intestate." He died with his Will in place. The Will did not name Marge as 
a devisee of anything except personal property. It only named her as the 
personal representative responsible for including the settlement proceeds in 
the Estate. 
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If the injured party dies from causes other than the 
original injury, the heirs do not inherit the cause of action. 
Pursuant to the Survival Statute, the decedent's estate is 
entitled only to the out-of-pocket expenses paid by the decedent 
prior to his death, and any settlement proceeds should therefore 
go directly into the decedent's estate. The following exchange 
at the hearing in the Trial Court emphasizes the intent of that 
statute: 
MR. MCCOY: Well, I think that the [survival] 
statute intended to benefit those heirs that were directly 
affected by the tort case ... 
THE COURT: Well, and that's exactly what it would 
do if it went into the estate of [Grant], not directly but 
indirectly it would benefit the heirs that he said should 
benefit.... 
R. 564. Thus, in order to properly carry out the letter and 
intent of the survival statute, to properly benefit Grant's 
Estate, and to properly reimburse the Estate for expenses 
incurred prior to Grant's death, the settlement proceeds from the 
personal injury action should be returned to Grant's Estate. 
B. The Trial Court Was Correct in Awarding Interest to Mr. 
Mitchell on the Estate Cash Deficiency. 
An award of interest by a trial court is within the court's 
equitable discretion. Such a decision, therefore, will only be 
disturbed if there has been an abuse of discretion. Ms. Wood 
claims her alleged settlement offer is tantamount to a "tender." 
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On her denial of Mr. Mitchell's claim, however, she denied 
liability on the entire amount and refused the claim. R. 17, 47, 
161. Further, the Affidavit of John McCoy states that the 
$48,100.00 was offered in settlement of the entire matter, 
including the issue of the personal injury settlement, which was 
decided below in favor of Mr. Mitchell. In light of this, the 
Trial Court's award of interest is appropriate, authorized, and 
should therefore stand. 
V. CONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED 
Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court find in 
his favor and reverse that part of the Trial Court's Order 
denying part of Mr. Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment on his 
claim and granting Ms. Wood's Motion for Summary Judgment in 
part. Accordingly, Mr. Mitchell requests that this Court reverse 
the Trial Court's Order as to the Checking Account Payments and 
Estate Cash Deficiency by granting Mr. Mitchell judgment as a 
matter of law on the full amount of $96,642.58 and $52,875.40, 
respectively. 
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Mr, Mitchell also hereby requests oral argument on this 
appeal. 
DATED this 21st day of December, 1995, 
SNOW, CHRISTEN^N/& (MkgTTINEAU 
Kim R. Wilson 
David L. Pinkston 
Attorneys for Appellant, Neil R, 
Mitchell 
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Grace M. SIBSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY OF PAULSBORO, Trustee 
under the Will of 
William A. Sibson, Deceased, Defendant-
Respondent, 
and 
Walter W. SIBSON et al., Defendants-
Appellants. 
No. A-782. 
Superior Court of New Jersey 
Appellate Division. 
Argued Nov. 7, 1960. 
Decided Dec. 6, 1960. 
Action by widow for construction of trust 
provision of her husband's will. From adverse 
judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery 
Division, Gloucester County, 61 N. J.Super. 88, 
160 A.2d 76, the remaindermen appealed. 
The Superior Court, Appellate Division, 
Sullivan, J.A.D., held that under 
testamentary trust directing payment of 
income therefrom to testator's wife for life and 
authorizing trustee to pay such portion of 
corpus to wife as should be necessary for her 
support, health and maintenance, it was not 
intention of testator, who had received 
substantial legacies from his family and who 
had no children of his own and who was 
friendly with his brother and sister and their 
children and who left remainder to his brother 
and sister, that wife was to be supported 
wholly out of trust income and corpus without 
regard to her own separate income, and 
separate income of wife had to be considered 
in determining whether it was necessary to 
invade the corpus, but it was not necessary 
that wife exhaust her separate estate before 
recourse could be had to corpus of trust. 
Judgment modified. 
[11 WILLS <3~ 440 
409k440 
In construing a will, function of court is to 
ascertain and give effect to purpose of testator 
as set forth in his will, and court is not limited 
by form or terminology in its quest of what 
testator meant by his testamentary language, 
and entire will must be considered rather than 
an isolated portion thereof, and where there is 
an ambiguity, surrounding facts and 
circumstances are proper objects of 
consideration. 
[1] WILLS <®=> 441 
409k441 
In construing a will, function of court is to 
ascertain and give effect to purpose of testator 
as set forth in his will, and court is not limited 
by form or terminology in its quest of what 
testator meant by his testamentary language, 
and entire will must be considered rather than 
an isolated portion thereof, and where there is 
an ambiguity, surrounding facts and 
circumstances are proper objects of 
consideration. 
[1] WILLS <&* 470(1) 
409k470(l) 
In construing a will, function of court is to 
ascertain and give effect to purpose of testator 
as set forth in his will, and court is not limited 
by form or terminology in its quest of what 
testator meant by his testamentary language, 
and entire will must be considered rather than 
an isolated portion thereof, and where there is 
an ambiguity, surrounding facts and 
circumstances are proper objects of 
consideration. 
[2] WILLS <^ 684.10(5) 
409k684.10(5) 
Under testamentary trust directing payment 
of income therefrom to testator's wife for life 
and authorizing trustee to pay such portion of 
corpus of trust to wife as should be necessary 
for her support, health and maintenance, it 
was not intention of testator, who had received 
substantial legacies from his family and who 
had no children of his own and who was 
friendly with his brother and sister and their 
children, who left remainder to brother and 
sister, that wife was to be supported wholly 
out of trust income and corpus without regard 
to her own separate income, and separate 
income of wife had to be considered in 
determining whether it was necessary to 
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invade the corpus, but it was not necessary 
that wife exhaust her separate estate before 
recourse could be had to corpus of trust. 
[3] WILLS <3=* 441 
409k441 
In determining intent of testator, only those 
circumstances which were known to testator 
when he made his will will be considered in 
determining his intent. 
**801 *226 Martin F. Caulfield, Woodbury, 
for plaintiff-Respondent (Hannold & Hannold, 
Woodbury, attorneys). 
Robert E. Gladden, Camden, for defendant-
respondent (Ross & Gladden, Camden, 
attorneys). 
John P. Hauch, Jr., Camden, for defendants-
appellants (Archer, Greiner, Hunter & Read, 
Camden, attorneys). 
Before Judges PRICE, GAULKIN and 
SULLIVAN. 
*227 The opinion of the court was delivered 
by 
SULLIVAN, J.A.D. 
This appeal is from the judgment of the trial 
court construing certain provisions of the will 
of William A. Sibson (hereinafter referred to 
as decedent) who died on August 17, 1955, a 
resident of Gloucester County. Plaintiff is his 
widow. Defendants-appellants are the 
remaindermen under the will. 
Plaintiff married the decedent on February 
3, 1931. No children were born of this 
marriage, which was decedent's first and 
plaintiffs second. Plaintiff had no children by 
her previous marriage. During her marriage 
to decedent, plaintiff appears to have had not 
separate estate or income of her own and was 
entirely dependent on her husband for her 
support. 
The will of decedent had been executed on 
May 14, 1951. Briefly, it provided in 
paragraph Fifth that if plaintiff survived 
Copr. ® West 1995 No clai 
decedent for 30 days, a trust was to be 
established of the residue of the estate, and 
'(A) To pay in quarter-annual installments 
the net income arising from the said 
residuary estate, hereinafter designated 
'principal', to my said wife for as long as she 
shall live, such payments to commence as 
soon after may deceased as may be 
reasonably convenient for my Trustee, and 
further to pay to my said wife, freed and 
discharged from all trusts and uses, as much 
of the principal as my Trustee in its sole 
discretion shall determine necessary for her 
support, health and maintenance.' 
Upon the death of plaintiff, 'the remaining 
principal, if any,' was to be distributed to 
decedent's brother and sister or their issue. 
Pursuant to the will the trust was set up by 
defendant-respondent trustee, and the income 
thereof, approximating $3,750 annually, has 
been paid to plaintiff. In addition, the trustee 
has advanced to plaintiff, out of trust 
principal, the sum of $1,075 for painting and 
repairs to the house in which plaintiff lives. 
In April 1959 plaintiff filed this suit seeking 
construction of decedent's will and directing 
the trustee to make payments *228 to her out 
of the Corpus of the trust. The case was 
submitted to the trial court on the pleadings, 
pretrial order and the depositions of plaintiff 
and her brother-in-law, who handled all of 
plaintiff's business affairs. 
The record indicates the following. At the 
present time plaintiff is the sole owner of the 
home in which she lives in Woodbury, New 
Jersey. The property, which is unencumbered, 
originally belonged to plaintiff and decedent 
as tenants by the entirety. Plaintiff also has a 
life estate in a summer home in Canada. 
Shortly before decedent's death he gave 
plaintiff $2,000, and on his death she collected 
$2,500 on **802 a life insurance policy and 
also received $21,600 over a period of three 
years from a group life insurance policy which 
covered decedent. Plaintiff is the beneficiary 
of a non-taxable annuity of $1,200 paid by 
decedent's former employer, and since 1957 
has been receiving Social Security payments 
at a current rate of $83.30 per month. Since 
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decedent's death she has invested $34,242.19 
in securities which produce an annual income 
of $1,200. She also has bank accounts totaling 
$4,000 and a 1959 automobile purchased for 
$2,750. 
It thus appears that plaintiff is in receipt of 
independent income of her own approximating 
$3,400 annually which, together with her 
income from the trust, gives her a total 
income of approximately $7,150. Her federal 
income tax is about $600. Plaintiffs average 
expenses for the past four years were shown to 
be $3,300 per year and, while plaintiff 
asserted that they represented a thriftier 
manner of living than that to which she was 
accustomed while her husband was living, the 
trial court found that her total income from all 
sources was quite adequate to maintain her 
according to her former standard of living. 
At the trial plaintiff took the position that 
paragraph Fifth (A) of the will meant that (1) 
plaintiff was to receive all of the income from 
the trust, and (2) all of the expenses necessary 
for plaintiffs support, health and maintenance 
were to be paid out of the principal of the 
trust. The *229 trial court rejected the latter 
contention and held that the provision 
'necessary for her support, health and 
maintenance' referred to the possible 
inadequacy of trust income for these purposes. 
The court, in effect, construed paragraph 
Fifth (A) to mean that to the extent that the 
income of the trust was inadequate to provide 
for plaintiffs support, health and 
maintenance, recourse was to be had to trust 
Corpus. The court therefore directed the 
trustee not to take plaintiffs separate income 
into consideration in determining what 
payments should be made out of Corpus. 
The trial court attached particular 
significance to the gift over of 'the remaining 
principal, if any,' after plaintiffs death. This 
indicated to the trial court that decedent 
contemplated the very real possibility that 
there might be no Corpus left over for the 
remaindermen. The court held that such 
provision indicated that plaintiff was to be the 
primary object of decedent's bounty in the use 
of the Corpus, which was 'to be liberal and not 
just a stopgap against the vicissitudes of life.' 
The trial court's opinion is reported in 61 
N. J.Super. 88, 160 A.2d 76 (Ch.Div.1960) 
[1] In construing a will the function of the 
court is to ascertain and give effect to the 
purpose of the testator as set forth in his will. 
Busch v. Plews, 12 N.J. 352, 96 A.2d 761 
(1953). The court is not limited by form or 
terminology in its quest of what the testator 
meant by his testamentary language. The 
entire will must be considered rather than an 
isolated portion thereof, and where there is an 
ambiguity, surrounding facts and 
circumstances are proper objects of 
consideration. Morristown Trust Co. v. 
McCann, 19 N.J. 568,118 A.2d 16 (1955). 
[2] The provisions of the will at hand 
indicate that decedent wanted his wife amply 
provided for during her lifetime but, save for a 
bequest of his 'strictly personal effects' to 
plaintiff, he did not want her to receive any 
part of the principal of his estate unless 
necessary for her support. To that end his 
estate is preserved during plaintiffs *230 
lifetime, but upon her death it goes to 
decedent's blood relatives. 
The record shows that decedent had received 
substantial legacies from his family. He had 
no children of his own and was friendly with 
his brother and sister and their children. It 
was therefore perfectly natural for decedent to 
provide that his entire estate should go to his 
blood relatives **803 after his wife had been 
amply taken care of during her lifetime. 
We do not agree with the trial court's ruling 
that decedent intended that plaintiff was to be 
supported wholly out of trust income and 
Corpus without regard to plaintiffs separate 
income. We do not interpret paragraph Fifth 
to have that meaning. Normal understanding 
of the language used by decedent would 
indicate that plaintiffs separate income was 
to be considered. How else would the trustee 
determine what was necessary for her 
support? In addition, the greater part of 
plaintiffs separate income comes from sources 
provided or arranged for by decedent during 
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his lifetime. The provisions in the will are all 
part of the same pattern and must be 
interpreted in the light of these surrounding 
facts and circumstances. 
[3] Plaintiff argues that there is nothing in 
the record to show that in April 1951, the date 
decedent's will was executed, any of these 
circumstances were in existence or had been 
arranged for by decedent, and cites Zwoyer v. 
Hackensack Trust Co., 61 N.J.Super. 9, 160 
A.2d 156 (App.Div.1960), for the proposition 
that only those circumstances which were 
known to decedent when he made his will may 
be considered in determining his intent. 
The rule cited is correct but its application 
to the facts of this case is invalid. Decedent's 
will speaks as of the date of his death, and it is 
only reasonable to assume that decedent, in 
expressing his testamentary plan for his wife, 
intended that such plan would fit in with 
whatever other arrangements he either had 
made or would make in the future for her. So, 
too, with plaintiffs Social Security *231 
payments which commenced about 1957. 
Certainly decedent, in planning for his wife's 
security, would have been aware that plaintiff 
would eventually come into these benefits. 
There are cases where a testator establishes 
a trust 'for support,' and specifies that if the 
income from such trust is insufficient for that 
purpose, then so much of Corpus as may be 
necessary for that purpose shall be used. In 
such instance the courts have held that the 
testator has clearly indicated that the trust is 
to provide the entire support without 
considering the beneficiary's separate income. 
Pearce v. Marcellus, 137 N. J.Eq. 599, 45 A.2d 
889 (E. & A. 1945); Hicks v. Jones, 138 
N.J.Eq. 280, 47 A.2d 894 (Ch.1946); Orange 
First National Bank v. Preiss, 2 N.J.Super. 
486, 64 A.2d 475 (Ch.Div.1949). 
However, where the life tenant is given the 
income of the trust, with a further provision 
authorizing the trustee to invade Corpus if 
necessary for the life tenant's support, the 
separate income of the life tenant must be 
considered in determining whether it is 
necessary to invade Corpus. Stetson v. 
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Community Chest, 24 N.J.Super. 243, 93 A.2d 
796 (Ch.Div.1952); In re WiUey's Estate, 139 
N.J.Eq. 118, 48 A.2d 789 (Prerog.1946). Cf. 
Renner v. Castellano, 21 N.J.Super. 331, 91 
A.2dl76(Ch.Div.l952). 
In 2 A.L.R.2d, at p. 1431, in discussing this 
question, it is stated that no general rule is 
available other than that the intention of the 
testator must govern in each particular case. 
The Annotation adds, at p. 1432, that: 
'By the weight of authority, unless the 
language of the trust instrument 
affirmatively reveals an intention to make a 
gift of the stated benefaction regardless of 
the beneficiary's other means, the trustee 
should consider such other means in 
exercising his discretion to disburse the 
principal for the purpose.' 
The construction given the will by the trial 
court could result in plaintiffs amassing a 
large estate for her own testamentary 
purposes, more or less at the expense of 
decedent's estate and the remaindermen 
named in decedent's will. *232 Clearly, this is 
contrary to the testamentary plan expressed 
by decedent. 
We hold that under a proper construction of 
decedent's will the separate income **804 of 
plaintiff is to be considered by the trustee. It 
has been suggested by appellants that not only 
plaintiffs separate income but also her 
separate estate would have to be exhausted 
before recourse could be had to trust Corpus. 
We do not read the will to mean that the use 
of trust Corpus is so limited. If the trust 
income, together with plaintiffs separate 
income, is insufficient to provide for plaintiffs 
support, health and maintenance, trust Corpus 
is to be used, and the trustee is to administer 
the trust accordingly. 
The judgment of the trial court is modified 
to the extent indicated herein. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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SECURITY-PEOPLES TRUST 
COMPANY, Executor of the Estate of 
Edna Buhl Putts, 
Deceased, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. 
Civ. A. No. 1101- Erie. 
United States District Court W.D. 
Pennsylvania. 
Feb. 2,1965. 
Action to recover estate takes paid. The 
District Court, Weber, J., held that decedent 
did not possess, for estate tax purposes, 
general power of appointment over assets in 
trust estate established under will of her 
husband where (1) title and possession of trust 
assets was in hands of independent corporate 
trustee legally accountable under state law, 
for its administration, not only to decedent but 
to successive life income beneficiaries and 
remaindermen and (2) trustee alone was 
vested with discretion to make invasion of 
principal. 
Order accordingly. 
[1] INTERNAL REVENUE <S^  4157.10(1) 
220k4157.10(l) 
Formerly 220k994 
It was congressional intent to tax as part of 
estate of decedent any property over which 
decedent had such power of control as to be 
able to (1) apply it to his own benefit or benefit 
of his creditors, (2) dispose of it by will, (3) 
appoint it to his estate or creditors of his 
estate, or (4) consume it without restriction. 
26 U.S.C.A. (LR.C.1954) § 2041. 
[2] WILLS <^ 470(3) 
409k470(3) 
Under Pennsylvania law, true intention of 
testator, as found within four corners of will, 
must govern. 
[3] POWERS <3^ 32 
307k32 
Life tenant has, under Pennsylvania law, 
Page 1 
obligation to exercise in good faith power to 
use, occupy, consume, sell or dispose of 
property. 
[4] TRUSTS < ^ 135 
390kl35 
An "active trust", in Pennsylvania, is one in 
which active duties are imposed on trustee 
with respect to control and management of 
subject matter, and trust remains active so 
long as it is necessary that legal title to assets 
remain in trustee to enable him to perform his 
duties. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other 
judicial constructions and definitions. 
[5] TRUSTS &=> 131 
390kl31 
When there is no longer any duty in trustee 
except to transfer over to beneficiaries income 
and corpus of trust estate, trust becomes a 
"dry trust," and statute of uses, as part of 
common law of Pennsylvania, terminates 
trust. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other 
judicial constructions and definitions. 
[5] TRUSTS <&= 136 
390kl36 
When there is no longer any duty in trustee 
except to transfer over to beneficiaries income 
and corpus of trust estate, trust becomes a 
"dry trust," and statute of uses, as part of 
common law of Pennsylvania, terminates 
trust. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other 
judicial constructions and definitions. 
[61 TRUSTS <®^  276 
390k276 
Pennsylvania courts compel exercise of 
trustee's discretion to pay principal only when 
there has been showing of necessity and clear 
direction in trust instrument. 
[7] TRUSTS <S^ 276 
390k276 
Where there was series of further life 
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beneficiaries and remaindermen, trustee 
would be under strong duty to protect their 
interests in face of any request of life 
beneficiary for invasion of corpus and, under 
Pennsylvania law, would be bound to look into 
assets of life beneficiary's own estate to 
determine necessity. 
[8] WILLS < ^ 441 
409k441 
Court may look to extrinsic and 
contemporaneous circumstances to ascertain 
testator's intent. 
[9] INTERNAL REVENUE <3=> 4157.10(3) 
220k4157.10(3) 
Formerly 220k994 
Not every case must meet the "ascertainable 
standards" test but only those in which there 
is first shown a power in decedent to transfer 
or appropriate to himself; and even where 
such power is held by decedent, exception .to 
taxation may still result if power of decedent 
was limited by "ascertainable standards." 26 
U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 2041. 
[10] INTERNAL REVENUE <&=> 4157.10(3) 
220k4157.10(3) 
Formerly 220kl004 
If power of decedent was not of standard 
defined by Code as "general power", as 
measured by state law, "ascertainable 
standards" test need not be applied to 
determine taxability. 26 U.S.C.A. 
(I.R.C.1954) § 2041. 
[11] INTERNAL REVENUE «=> 4169(4) 
220k4169(4) 
Formerly 220kl008.3 
Statute requires, as test of eligibility for 
marital deduction, that surviving spouse who 
has life estate must also have power to 
appoint which is exercisable in all events. 26 
U.S.C.A. (LR.C.1954) § 2056. 
[12] INTERNAL REVENUE <^ 4157.10(1) 
220k4157.10(l) 
Formerly 220kl004 
The "general power of appointment" which is 
standard for determining inclusion of assets in 
gross estate of decedent is power of same kind 
and quality as "power of appointment 
exercisable in all events" by surviving spouse 
which qualifies assets for marital deduction. 
26 U.S.C.A. (LR.C.1954) §§ 2041, 2055, 2056 
and subd. (b) (5). 
[131 INTERNAL REVENUE O^ 4157.10(1) 
220k4157.10(l) 
Formerly 220kl004 
If decedent had no power to appoint to herself 
exercisable in all events she had no "general 
power of appointment", for estate tax 
purposes. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 2041. 
[141 INTERNAL REVENUE G=> 4157.10(1) 
220k4157.10(l) 
Formerly 220kl004 
Decedent did not possess, for estate tax 
purposes, general power of appointment over 
assets in trust estate established under will of 
her husband, where (1) title and possession of 
trust assets was in hands of independent 
corporate trustee legally accountable under 
state law, for its administration, not only to 
decedent but to successive life income 
beneficiaries and remaindermen and (2) 
trustee alone was vested with discretion to 
make invasion of principal. 26 U.S.C.A. 
(I.R.C.1954) § 2041. 
•41 Daniel L. R. Miller, McClure & Miller, 
Erie, Pa., for plaintiff. 
Gustave Diamond, U.S. Atty., Pittsburgh, 
Pa., for defendant. 
WEBER, District Judge. 
This case involves an action in the United 
States District Court to recover estate taxes 
paid by decedent's estate on the corpus of a 
testamentary trust established under the willl 
of decedent's husband. The government 
claims that the tax is due under the provisions 
of § 2041(aX2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, 26 U.S.C.1958 Ed. § 2041; 26 U.S.C.A. § 
2041. 
Decedent, Edna Buhl Putts, died testate 
June 7,1960, a resident of Erie, Pennsylvania. 
A deficiency in estate taxes was assessed 
against her estate by the Internal Revenue 
Service by reason of its inclusion in her estate 
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of the corpus of the trust in question. This was 
paid, a timely claim for refund was made and 
disallowed, and this action followed. 
A trial was held before this Court without 
jury. Most of the matters in evidence were 
stipulated between the parties. Taxpayer 
produced two witnesses, trust officers of 
plaintiff bank, to testify as to the computation 
of the refund claimed by plaintiff, and to 
testify, under objection by the government, 
that there had been no invasion of the 
principal of the trust fund during decedent's 
life, and no request from decedent for such 
invasion, that the trustee was familiar with 
the extent of decedent's own estate which was 
approximately four and one-half times as 
large as the trust estate, that her income from 
the trust estate was approximately twelve 
percent of her total income, that her income 
exceeded her expenditures and she increased 
the corpus of her own estate, and that the 
trustee was personally familiar with her 
manner of living. The Government objected 
that such evidence was irrelevant and 
immaterial to the legal issues involved here. 
The government contends that the decedent 
possessed at the time of her death a general 
power of appointment over the corpus of the 
trust created by her husband's will, and 
further that this general power of 
appointment was not limited to an 
ascertainable standard. Because of this the 
government claims that the corpus of this 
trust is includable in the gross estate of 
decedent for federal estate *42 tax purposes 
under § 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The applicable provisions of the statute are as 
follows: 
'§2041. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT 
'(a) In General.- The value of the gross 
estate shall include the value of all property.-
'(2) Powers created after October 21, 1942.-
To the extent of any property with respect to 
which the decedent has at the time of his 
death a general power of appointment created 
after October 21,1942, * * *. 
Copr. © West 1995 No 
'(b) Definitions.- For purposes of subsection 
(a)-
'(1) General power of appointment.- The 
term 'general power of appointment' means a 
power which is exercisable in favor of the 
decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the 
creditors of his estate; except that-
'(A) A power to consume, invade, or 
appropriate property for the benefit of the 
decedent which is limited by an ascertainable 
standard relating to the health, education, 
support, or maintenance of the decedent shall 
not be deemed a general power of 
appointment. '* * *' (26 U.S.C. 1958 Ed. § 
2041) 
Decedent's husband, B. Swayne Putts, 
predeceased his wife on January 31, 1952. By 
his will, executed on October 4, 1948, except 
for personal effects given to his wife, he left 
his entire estate to the Security-Peoples Trust 
Company in trust. [FN1] 
*43 We have appended the trust provisions 
in full because we believe that this instrument 
determines the problem confronting us, 
whether this instrument confers *44 a 
'general power of appointment' upon the 
decedent, Edna Buhl Putts, which she 
possessed at the time of her death. 
The Treasury Regulations on Estate Tax 
(1954 Code) § 20.204M(bXD, further defines a 
power of appointment to include 'all powers 
which are in substance and effect powers of 
appointment regardless of the nomenclature 
used in creating the power and regardless of 
the local property law connotations.' § 
20.2041-l(c) of the Regulations defines a 
general power of appointment as a power 
'exercisable in favor of the decedent, his 
estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his 
estate.' 
The legislative history of § 2041 may throw 
some light on the intention of Congress in 
adopting the above definition. 
§ 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 
originated in the Powers of Appointment Act 
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of 1951, which amended the prior Act of 1942. 
TKe Senate Committee on Finance reported on 
the bill (H.R.2084), Senate Report No. 382, 
June 4, 1951: 
'General Statement 
This bill simplifies sections 811(f) and 
1000(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, relating 
to estate and gift tax on powers of 
appointment. 
The present law taxes all powers to appoint, 
whether exercised or not, except two specified 
classes of powers. One of these exempts 
powers to appoint to certain near relatives. 
The other is intended to exempt fiduciary 
powers but has proved inadequate for the 
purpose. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 1530) 
'The provisions of the 1942 act, taxing the 
exercise of limited powers of appointment and 
the mere possession of unexercised powers, 
were new to the Federal tax system. They 
extended, or might be construed to extend, to 
emergency powers to invade principal, 
discretionary powers given to trustees, and 
other types of powers which had theretofore 
not been regarded as powers of appointment. * 
* * (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 1531) 
'As to powers created after the passage of 
the 1942 act, the bill subjects to estate tax the 
possession of a general power to appointment, 
whether or not the power is exercised, *45 and 
subjects to gift tax the exercise or release of 
such power. The bill defines a general power 
of appointment as a power which is 
exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, 
his creditors, or the creditors of his estate. 
This includes a general beneficial power to 
appoint by will. It also includes certain rights 
to consume principal. It provides a test of 
taxability which is simple, clear-cut, and easy 
to apply. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 1531) 
'* * * Your committee believes that the most 
important consideration is to make the law 
simple and definite enough to be understood 
and applied by the average lawyer, and that 
the present bill will accomplish that purpose, 
(p. 1531) 'Discussion of Specific Provisions 
Copr. © West 1995 No clai 
'The definition provides that, if certsrin 
limitations or restrictions are present, a power 
is not a general power even though exercisable 
by the decedent in his own favor, (p. 1533) 
'If the holder of a power is legally 
accountable for its exercise of non-exercise, the 
power is not deemed to be a general power. 
However, a power which is exercisable in 
favor of the holder, his estate, his creditors, or 
the creditors of his estate, is not regarded as a 
power for which the holder is legally 
accountable.' (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 1534) 2 
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative 
Service, 82nd Congress 1st Session 1951, p. 
1530 et seq. 
[1] From these statements, we draw the 
conclusion that Congress intended to tax as 
part of the estate of a decedent any property 
over which the decedent had such a power of 
control as to be able to apply it to his ovrci 
benefit, or the benefit of his creditors, to 
dispose of it by will, or to appoint it to his 
estate or the creditors of his estate, or to 
consume it without restriction. This fits the 
ordinary definitions of what lawyers call a 
'general power of appointment.' 41 Am.Jur. 
'Powers', §§ 3, 4, pp. 807, 808; 72 C.J.S. 
Powers § 1, p. 401. 
The Senate report indicates a different 
treatment where the holder is not completely 
free from legal control or restraint in the 
disposition of the property. It states that 
where the holder of the power is 'legally 
accountable' for its exercise it is not deemed a 
general power. This can only refer to 
fiduciary powers which are always subject to 
the control of the courts and for which the 
holder is always under a legal duty to account. 
The Senate speaks of its intention, in passing 
the Act, of making the intended exemption of 
fiduciary powers in the prior law more 
adequate. 
The decided cases which have construed this 
section of the Internal Revenue Code, [FN2] as 
well as those cases which construed the 
provisions relating to powers of appointment 
for determining the right to a charitable 
deduction (§ 2055), and the right to the 
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marital deduction (§ 2056), all resort to an 
examination of the scope or breadth of the 
power under local law. 
'The initial step is to determine in light of 
local law, the interest conveyed to the 
decedent under this trust, i.e., the extent to 
which, consonant sonant with testamentary 
trust provision, the decedent could invade and 
consume the principal. Morgan v. 
Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 60 S.Ct. 424, 84 
L.Ed. 585 (1940); Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue v. Ellis' Estate, 252 F.2d 109, 113 (3 
Cir. 1958); Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F. *46 
2d 598, 602 (90 A.L.R.2d 405) (3 Cir.1960).' 
Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234, at pp. 238 
and 239, (3d Cir. 1964). 
[2] In Pennsylvania the cardinal rule of 
construction is that the true intention of the 
testator must govern, as that intention may be 
found within the four cornes of the will. Fox 
Appeal, 99 Pa. 382, Anderson's Estate, 243 
Pa. 34, 89 A. 306; In re Reefer's Estate, 353 
Pa. 281, 45 A.2d 31, 165 A.L.R. 1277. 
'This is but one of the hundreds of 
expressions of the cardinal rule in the 
interpretation of wills to find the testator's 
intent, and by that is meant his actual, 
personal, individual intent, not a mere 
presumptive conventional intent inferred from 
the use of a set phrase or a familiar form of 
words.' Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218 at p. 225, 
43 A. 131 at 132 (1899). 
With this in mind let us examine the 
instrument by which this power was created. 
From it we find the following: 
1. Testator left his entire estate (except for 
his personal effects) to the trust. 
2. Testator chose a sole, independent, 
corporate trustee to administer the trust. 
3. Testator provided detailed powers and 
limitations over the Trustee in the 
management of the trust assets, its allocations 
of principal, capital growth, income, 
accumulations and distribution. 
Copr. ® West 1995 No 
4. Testator intended a long term 
administration of this trust. Testator created 
several successive beneficiaries; first his wife, 
during her lifetime; then his daughter, for her 
lifetime; then after his daughter's death, one-
half to his son-in-law for his lifetime; the 
remaining one-half of the income to his 
granddaughters until they become 45 years of 
age; after the death of his son-in-law all the 
income to the grandchildren; and if the 
grandchildren should die before reaching age 
45, then to issue of the grandchildren until 
they become 21 years of age. 
5. From the above we conclude that his 
wife, Edna Buhl Putts, the within decedent, 
was not the primary object of his bounty. 
6. The power to invade is spoken of in terms 
of 'advance portions of principal.' Such 
advances were to be made a charge and 
deduction from any principal payment later 
due to the recipient of said advancement or 
any person claiming through or under the 
same. Since no principal payment would be 
due to either Testator's wife (the within 
decedent); his daughter or his son-in-law, the 
only conclusion that we can make from this 
language is that the Testator did not 
contemplate principal advancements in the 
ordinary course of events to these income 
beneficiaries (a factor which is demonstrated 
by other evidence in this case outside the 
Will). 
7. Testator did not authorize invasion of 
principal for all of the income beneficiaries, he 
lists only his wife, his daughter and the 
children of his daughter. 
8. Testator directed that Trustee exercise its 
discretion liberally for the beneficiaries 
named, i.e., his wife, his daughter, and his 
grandchildren, with no indication of 
preference, but only for the specific purposes of 
promoting their health, comfort, maintenance 
or welfare. 
9. Testator provided that none of the shares 
of income or principal of the respective 
beneficiaries should be in any way or manner 
subject or liable to their anticipation, sale, 
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pledge, debts, contracts, engagements or 
liabilities, and shall not be liable to 
attachment or execution or sequestration 
under any legal or equitable or other process. 
10. Finally, the power to make 
advancements of principal is vested solely in 
the independent corporate Trustee, at such 
times, in such amounts, and for such purposes 
as the Trustee in its discretion may deem 
advisable. 
The government argues that it is the 
substance and effect of the transaction that 
will govern, rather than the form. 
'Technical considerations, niceties of the law 
of trusts or conveyances, *47 or the legal 
paraphernalia which inventive genius may 
construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not 
obscure the basic issue.' Helvering v. Clifford, 
309 U.S. 331, at p. 334, 60 S.Ct. 554, at p. 556, 
84 L.Ed. 788(1940). 
Under its view, 'a power to consume, invade, 
or appropriate for the benefit of a decedent' is 
a general power of appointment, taking these 
words from the specific exception of § 
2041(bXlXA) as to those powers limited to an 
ascertainable standard. Without going further 
into the question of ascertainable standard, we 
must proceed with our inquiry into the effect 
of the law of Pennsylvania on the language of 
the will here. 
The Government argues that 'under 
Pennsylvania law a beneficiary can compel a 
trustee to exercise its discretion to use the 
trust property for the benefit of the 
beneficiary.' We have examined the 
Pennsylvania cases cited by it and we do not 
find that to be a complete statement of the law 
of Pennsylvania. Rather the Pennsylvania 
rule appears to be that in a proper case, after 
considering the instrument creating the trust 
and ascertaining from it the donor's or 
testator's intentions; and considering the 
circumstances calling for the exercise of 
discretion, a Pennsylvania court can compel a 
Trustee's exercise of discretion to carry out the 
donor's or testator's intention, and conversely, 
under the proper circumstances, it will uphold 
Copr. ® West 1995 No c 
the refusal of the Trustee to make payments 
under discretion granted it. 
[3] First, we must distinguish between Ihe 
cases where a legal trust estate has been 
created and those cases where there is no legal 
trust estate but rather where an individual 
has been given an estate for life in real or 
personal property with a power to use, occupy, 
consume, sell or dispose of, with a gift over of 
the remainder. In the latter class of cases the 
Pennsylvania courts hold that the life tenant 
is still under a legal obligation to exercise tliis 
power in 'good faith.' Rumsey's Estate, 287 
Pa. 448, 135 A. 119 (1926); 'honestly and 
fairly,' Zumbro v. Zumbro, 69 Pa.Super. 600 
(1910), and not to defeat the intention of the 
testator, In re Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218, 43 
A. 131 (1899). 
>* * * ^e c o u r ^ c a n onjy interfere to protect 
the remaindermen when the widow attempts 
to divert the fund from the purpose for which 
it was bequeathed her.' Watson's Estate, 241 
Pa. 271, at p. 280, 88 A. 433 at p. 436 (1913). 
See also Powell's Estate, 340 Pa. 404, 17 
A.2d 391 (1941). 
In Tyson's Estate, supra, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, said, 191 Pa. at p. 225, 43 A. 
at p. 132: 
'The court below held that * * * the 
personalty passed to his widow absolutely, on 
the ground that a bequest of personalty, with 
power to consume, sell, and dispose of, carries 
an absolute and unrestricted title to it. That 
such is the general rule cannot be disputed, ft 
is not, however, a rule of law, but a rule of 
construction in aid of reaching the intent of 
the testator; and, where a different intent is 
clear, the rule cannot be applied to defeat it.' 
In Tyson's Estate, supra, it was held that 
the widow's power did not include a power of 
testamentary disposition to exclude the 
remaindermen. 
A stronger rule applies where the testator 
has given title and possession of the trust 
assets to an independent trustee with 
to oiig. U.S. govt, works — » 
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discretion to invade corpus for the benefit of 
an income beneficiary. In such cases the 
trustee in Pennsylvania is controlled in his 
administration and disposition of assets by the 
provisions of the Pennsylvania Fiduciaries 
Act, Act of April 18, 1949, P.L. 512, 20 P.S. § 
320. 101 et seq. This Act imposes duties of 
accounting, control of the court, audit, notice 
to parties in interest, and approval of 
distributions. While the Federal tax cases 
look to the substance rather than the form of a 
transaction, nevertheless we see a difference 
in substance rather than form where the 
power or the discretion is imposed on one who 
is subject *48 to control of the laws of 
Pennsylvania governing trustees. 
[4][5] An 'active' trust in Pennsylvania is 
one in which active duties are imposed on the 
trustee with respect to the control and 
management of the subject matter. Bowman's 
Estate, 332 Pa. 197, 2 A.2d 725 (1938). It 
remains an active trust so long as it is 
necessary that legal title to the assets remain 
in the trustee to enable him to perform his 
duties. Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust 
Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 A. 380, 91 A.L.R. 99 
(1933). When there is no longer any duty in 
the trustee except to transfer over to the 
beneficiary the income and the corpus of the 
trust estate, the trust becomes a 'dry' trust, 
Bergland's Estate, 372 Pa. 1, 92 A.2d 207 
(1952); Hemphill's Estate, 180 Pa. 95, 36 A. 
409 (1897), and the Statute of Uses as part of 
the common law of Pennsylvania terminates 
the trust. Sheridan v. Coughlin, 352 Pa. 226, 
42 A.2d 618 (1945); Overbeck v. McHale, 354 
Pa. 177, 47 A.2d 142 (1946); Sheasley's Trust, 
366 Pa. 316, 77 A.2d 448 (1951). 
[6] The government, in its brief, has cited a 
number of Pennsylvania cases to support the 
proposition that this decedent could have 
compelled the trustee to pay over principal to 
her without regard to her need or the assets of 
her own estate, except only for the limitation 
of the 'good faith' standard. The good faith 
standard, in our view, has been limited to the 
life estate cases. Our examination of the 
Pennsylvania trustee cases reveals that the 
Pennsylvania courts will only compel the 
exercise of a trustee's discretion to invade 
principal when there has been a showing of 
necessity and a clear direction in the trust 
instrument. 
In Walter's Case, 278 Pa. 421, 123 A. 408 
(1923); Erisman v. Directors of the Poor, 47 
Pa. 509 (1864); and Hohenshieldt's Estate, 105 
Pa.Super. 18, 159 A. 71 (1932); the courts in 
each case compelled the trustee to exercise his 
discretion to invade the principal of a trust for 
the benefit of the beneficiary who had been 
declared an incompetent or a lunatic and was 
being maintained at public expense in a public 
institution. In such cases Pennsylvania 
statutes allow public bodies to recover this 
expense of support from any property or estate 
of the inmates. 
In Walter's Case, supra, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court said with respect to the 
discretion of a trustee: 
'* * * his discretion is but a legal one, and, 
whenever the law determines that a proper 
case has arisen in which the trustee's 
discretion should have been exercised on a 
particular way, he will be constrained to act in 
accordance therewith.' (278 Pa. at p. 423, 123 
A. at p. 409). 
In other cases such as Keller v. Commercial 
Trust Co., 73 Pa.Super. 533 (1919); In re 
Rudy's Estate, 71 Pa.Super. 448 (1918); 
Hughes' Estate, 231 Pa. 475, 80 A. 1104 
(1911); and Minnich v. People's Trust, 29 
Pa.Super. 334 (1905), the Court authorized or 
compelled the trustees to exercise discretion to 
invade corpus to provide for the needs of 
incompetents out of corpus of estates provided 
for their benefit. In the minnich v. People's 
Trust case, supra, the court held that the fact 
that the beneficiary had other assets was 
immaterial since the trust fund was expressly 
created for the benefit of the incompetent. In 
Hughes' Estate, supra, where the question of 
the extent and quality of the provisions for the 
beneficiary was involved, the Court stated. 
'It is held in Steele's Appeal, 47 Pa. 437, 
that a comfortable maintenance, measured by 
the station, habits, and tastes of the testator 
and the beneficiary, was intended, no more 
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and no less, without extravagance either as to 
place or material.' (231 Pa. at p. 477, 80 A. at 
p. 1105). 
In both Hill v. Hill, 277 Pa. 165, 120 A. 775 
(1923); and In re Brown's Appeal, 345 Pa. 373, 
29 A.2d 52 (1942), the Court compelled the 
exercise of the trustee's discretion to pay out 
funds despite the availability of other assets 
for the use of the beneficiaries because it *49 
found an absolute mandate in the trust 
instrument directing the use of the trust 
estate for such purposes. There was also 
evidence in these cases of the trustee 
withholding distribution because of family 
disagreements. 
But in the ordinary trust case the 
Pennsylvania Courts will restrict and control 
the trustee's exercise of discretion, and 
support the trustee's discretion to refuse or 
withhold invasion of principal. In Seacrist's 
Estate, 362 Pa. 190, 66 A.2d 836 (1949), the 
Court upheld the trustee's refusal to pay from 
principal to a disabled son, stating: 
To know the quality and quantity of 
petitioner's private estate becomes very 
material in order to determine his good faith 
and his necessities, (p. 194, 66 A.2d p. 838). 
In Briggs' Estate, 150 Pa.Super. 66, 27 A.2d 
430 (1942), the Court held: 
'* * * the exercise of discretion by trustees is 
nevertheless subject to the limitation that 
they must not act outside the bounds of 
reasonable judgment.' (p. 67, 27 A.2dp. 433). 
There, at the objection of a remainderman, 
the Court held that the Trustees had abused 
their discretion in making payment because 
the beneficiary had other means of support 
and would not personally benefit by payment. 
As stated by Circuit Judge Kalodner in 
Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598, at p. 603, 
90 A.L.R.2d 405 (3rd Cir.1960): 
'The rationale of the Pennsylvania decisions, 
cited in Ellis' Estate (252 F.2d 109), limiting a 
life tenant's withdrawals from principal, is the 
Copr. © West 1995 No c 
judicial safeguarding of remainder interests to 
assure compliance with the testator's intent as 
to such interests.' 
[7] In the present case, since there are a 
series of further life beneficiaries aind 
remaindermen, the trustee would be under a 
strong duty to protect their interests in the 
face of any request of the decedent for 
invasion. Under the Pennsylvania decisions, a 
Court would be bound to look into the assets of 
her own estate, which were well known to the 
trustee, who managed them. 
[8] The fact that this decedent had an estate 
of her own almost five times as great as that 
of her husband would not only compel the 
trustee to resist her request for invasion 
except for clear necessity, but it would also 
guide the court in any attempt to determine 
the testator's intent. The extent of testator's 
wife's personal estate would be a strong factor 
in his plan for the disposition of his own estate 
and the court may look to such extrinsic and 
contemporaneous circumstances to ascertain 
his intent. Scholler Trust, 403 Pa. 97, 169 
A.2d 554 (1961); Wolters' Estate, 359 Pa. 520, 
59 A.2d 147 (1948). 
The cases in which the Federal Courts have 
construed 2041 fall into two classes; those 
involving the question of whether decedent 
held a general power under the law, and thos-e 
which, after finding that decedent possessed a 
power to appoint to himself, seek to find if it i s 
limited by an ascertainable standard relating 
to health, education, support and 
maintenance. 
[9][10] Not every case must meet the 
'ascertainable standards' test, but only those 
in which there is first shown a power in the 
decedent to transfer or appropriate to himself. 
Where such power is held by the decedent, it 
may still result in an exception to taxation 
where the power of decedent is limited by the 
'ascertainable standards.' If the power of the 
decedent is not of the standard defined by the 
Code as a 'general power', as measured by 
state law, we need not consider the 
'ascertainable standards' measure. 
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In Pittsfield National Bank v. United 
States, 181 F.Supp. 851 (D.Mass.1960), where 
testatrix created a trust with an independent 
corporate trustee, with children as 
remaindermen, giving her husband a life 
income, 'together with all or such part of the 
principal of same as he may from time to time 
request, he to be the sole judge of his needs,' 
the *50 court held that the word 'needs' was a 
limitation because under local law husband 
only had the power to invade corpus in the 
event he was in financial or physical need. 
The court held that the words 'his needs' 
established an ascertainable standard. The 
court further paid regard to the evidence that 
Testatrix clearly intended to provide for 
remaindermen and that the husband had 
substantial property of his own so that it was 
unlikely that the corpus would be invaded. 
In Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3d 
Cir.1964) affirming 215 F.Supp. 513 
(E.D.Pa.1963), the Court of Appeals held that 
under Pennsylvania law, a beneficiary who 
was also the trustee, who had the power to 
appropriate to herself for her own 'benefit', 
was not limited to the ascertainable standard, 
particularly where 'the will emphatically 
reveals that the (beneficiary and trustee) (is) 
intended to be the main objects of the 
testatrix's bounty.' (330 F.2d p. 239, quoting 
from the District Court's opinion 215 F.Supp. 
at p. 517). 
The remainder of the Federal Court 
decisions under § 2041 all turn on whether the 
power to invade was a general or a limited 
power under applicable local law. [FN3] 
While the analogy between the § 2041 
'general power' cases and the § 2055 
'charitable deduction' cases has frequently 
been discussed in connection with the 
determination of the 'ascertainable standard', 
despite the different qualities which each 
attempts to define, we are of the opinion that 
decisions of the § 2056 cases, concerning the 
marital deduction, have a closer parallel to 
the interpretation of § 2041. 
[11][12] Section 2056(bX5) requires as a test 
of eligibility for the marital deduction that the 
surviving spouse who has a life estate must 
also have a power to appoint which is 
exercisable in all events. Hoffman v. 
McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir.1960). In 
other words, we believe that the 'general 
power of appointment' which is the standard 
for determining the inclusion of assets in the 
gross estate of a decedent under § 2041 is a 
power of the same kind and quality as the 
'power of appointment exercisable in all 
events' in the surviving spouse which qualifies 
the assets for the marital deduction under § 
2056. 
In discussing the analogy of ascertainable 
standards in a § 2041 and § 2055 case, Judge 
Freedman stated in Strite v. McGinnes, 215 
F.Supp. 513 at page 514 (note 2) 
(E.D.Pa.1963): 
'Cases under § 2056 have only limited 
relevance since the question which arises is 
not whether an ascertainable standard exists 
but whether any standard exists. In order to 
qualify for the marital deduction, the 
surviving spouse must have an unqualified 
power to appoint the principal to herself 
during her lifetime. The power must be one 
that may be exercised 'in all events." 
The wording of the two Code sections 
strengthens our belief that the powers of 
appointment under § 2041 and § 2056 are 
powers of the same kind and quality. 
'§ 2041(b) Definition 
'(1) General Power of Appointment.- The 
term 'general power of appointment' means a 
power which is exercisable in favor of the 
decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the 
creditors of his estate.' 
'§ 2056(bX5) Life estate with power of 
appointment in the surviving spouse.--In the 
case of an interest in property passing from 
the decedent, if his surviving spouse is 
entitled for life to all the income from the 
entire interest, or * * * a specific portion 
thereof * * * with power in the surviving 
spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such 
specific portion (exercisable in favor of such 
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surviving spouse, or of the estate of such 
surviving spouse, or in favor of either, 
whether or not in *51 each case the power is 
exercisable in favor of others), and with no 
power in any other person to appoint any part 
of the interest, or such specific portion, to any 
person other than the surviving spouse-
'(A) the interest of such portion thereof so 
passing shall, for purposes of subsection (a), be 
considered as passing to the surviving spouse, 
* * * > 
[13] Thus if a spouse has a 'general power of 
appointment' as defined in Section 2041(bXl) 
over property in which she has a life estate, it 
would qualify for the marital deduction of § 
2056. Conversely, we believe that if she has no 
power to appoint to herself exercisable in all 
events under the terms of § 2056, she has no 
'general power of appointment' in the terms of 
§ 2041(bXD. 
Following this line of reasoning we may 
consider two cases involving § 2056 decided in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, both of which arose in 
Pennsylvania and both of which were 
ultimately determined under the 
Pennsylvania law applicable. 
In Commissioner v. Ellis's Estate, 252 F.2d 
109 (3rd Cir.1958), decedent left his estate in 
trust, $5,000 per annum to be payable to his 
wife for life. He further provides that should 
his wife 'require' sums in excess of $5,000 per 
annum, 'she, and she alone, shall be the judge 
of how much shall be required,' the same 
should be paid to her, any deficiency of income 
to be supplied out of principal. On the death 
of his wife there were gifts of remainders, one-
half to the wife's estate, one-half to the 
children. The will also contained a spendthrift 
clause preserving the estate from pledge, 
assignment, anticipation, debts, or liabilities 
of any beneficiary. The estate claimed a 
marital deduction for assets of the trust. Chief 
Judge Biggs says, 252 F.2d at p. 113: 
'* * * We come then to the issue as to what 
was the exact nature of the power given Mrs. 
Ellis over the residuary estate during her 
Copr. © West 1995 No clai 
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lifetime. 
'The law of Pennsylvania must be applied to 
determine what was the nature of the power 
Mrs. Ellis possessed. Morgan v. 
Commissioner, 1939, 309 U.S. 78, 626, 60 
S.Ct. 424, 84 L.Ed. 585, 1035; Helvering v. 
Stuart, 1942, 317 U.S. 154, 63 S.Ct. 140, 87 
L.Ed. 154 * * *.' 
Chief Judge Biggs first determines that the 
power to consume corpus for herself under 
Pennsylvania law was limited by the 'good 
faith' standard which the Pennsylvania courts 
have imposed on life tenants. Rumsey's 
Estate, 287 Pa. 448, 135 A. 119 (1926); 
Zumbro v. Zumbro, 69 Pa.Super. 600 (1918); 
Degenkolv v. Daube, 143 Pa.Super. 579, 18 
A.2d 464 (1941); Tyson's Estate, 191 Pa. 218, 
43 A. 131 (1899). 
Secondly, decedent had named 
remaindermen. Therefore, the court 
concluded that she had no power to appoint by 
will. 
The court also found that there was no 
merger of a life estate and the one-half 
remainder given the life tenant's estate here 
under the general Pennsylvania rule (Conley's 
Estate, 197 Pa. 291, 47 A. 238 (1900), because 
of the spendthrift provision of the will. 
'* * * The Pennsylvania courts jealously 
uphold spendthrift trusts and see to it that the 
will of the testator is given effect as tie 
expressed it. In re Bosler's Estate, 1954, 378 
Pa. 333, 107 A.2d 443, 444. In the cited case 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated 
categorically that 'A life estate under a 
spendthrift trust will not coalesce or merge 
with an estate in remainder,' citing In re 
Moser's Estate, 1921, 270 Pa. 217, 113 A. 
199.'(252 F.2d at page 114). 
The conclusion of Chief Judge Biggs was 
therefore that one-half of the trust *52 estate 
which passed to other remaindermen, and to 
which the life tenant's power to consume was 
limited by the good faith standard and by the 
spendthrift provisions, did not qualify for the 
marital deduction. In other words the widow 
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did not possess a 'general power of 
appointment' as to that one-half of the trust 
estate. (The other half went to her estate by 
the terms of the will). 
A second case of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit which also 
applies the Pennsylvania law to a § 2056 
situation is Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 
598, (3rd Cir. 1960). Here again the Court 
considered the scope of the power to invade 
principal under a different set of testamentary 
directions. The Testator gave his wife 'the 
right to use and spend any or all of the 
principal of my said estate, if she so desires, 
and upon her request or requests made to 
(trustees) they shall pay to her from time to 
time any part of the principal of my estate she 
may desire and said trust shall cease as to 
that part of the principal so paid to her. * * *.' 
The Court of Appeals (Kalodner, C.J.) said, 
277 F.2d at p. 603: 
'It would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
state any more explicitly an intent to confer 
'an unrestricted power exercisable at any time 
during her life to use all or any part of the 
principal of the decedent's trust estate.' 
Judge Kalodner cites a number of 
Pennsylvania cases where the courts held the 
testator's intention to be that the beneficiary's 
demand was the sole requirement for invasion 
of principal. [FN4] In none of these cases is 
there any qualification, the beneficiary may 
use the proceeds for whatever purpose she sees 
fit, the trustee has no discretion but to pay 
over whatever is demanded. 
The cases fall into the classification 
described in Scott on Trusts, § 128.3, 
'Discretionary Trusts,' p. 67: 
'In such a case the amount to which the life 
beneficiary is entitled depends wholly upon 
his own desires, and the trustee has no 
discretion to withhold.' 
The court in Hoffman v. McGinnes, supra, 
held that this power satisfied the 
requirements for the marital deduction. It 
Copr. © West 1995 No c 
distinguished the case from Commissioner v. 
Ellis, supra, by stating: 
>* * * Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Ellis' Estate, supra, where it was held that a 
provision in the decedent's will authorizing 
the surviving wife's withdrawal from principal 
of such sums as she 'should require's did not 
vest in her a power of appointment, since 
under Pennsylvania law the surviving wife '* 
* * under the terms of the will did not possess 
an 'unlimited' power to invade the corpus or 
appoint the corpus to herself as unqualified 
owner', in view of the will's creation of 
'remainder' (252 F.2d 113) interests.' 277 F.2d 
598, at p. 600. 
It may be of interest to note the hope of the 
Senate Finance Committee (supra) that: 
'The most important consideration is to 
make the law simple and definite enough to be 
understood and applied by the average lawyer, 
and that the present bill will accomplish that 
purpose.' 
Not only the average lawyer, but the writers 
in the field of estate planning and estate 
taxation have placed a uniform construction 
on § 2041. [FN5] 
*53 [14] We are, therefore, of the opinion 
that the decedent, Edna Buhl Putts, did not 
possess at the time of her death a general 
power of appointment over the assets in the 
trust estate established under the will of her 
husband, B. Swayne Putts, held by the 
trustee, Security-Peoples Trust Company. We 
do not find that she held any power 
exercisable in her favor, or in favor of her 
estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her 
estate. We find that title and possession of the 
trust assets was in the hands of an 
independent corporate trustee, which under 
the law of Pennsylvania was legally 
accountable for its administration, not only to 
the decedent, but to successive life income 
beneficiaries and remaindermen. We find that 
the Trustee alone was vested with the 
discretion to make invasion of principal, which 
discretion had to be exercised reasonably, and 
solely for the benefit of the named 
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beneficiaries, and with regards to the needs 
and the other available assets of such 
beneficiary, and with regard to the protection 
of interests of other future beneficiaries and 
remaindermen. The decedent had no power to 
make an appointment, gift, transfer or 
testamentary disposition of any part of the 
trust assets to herself or her estate, and the 
assets were protected from the pledge, 
encumbrance, sale, anticipation, debts and 
liabilities of decedent by the testator's 
spendthrift provision. 
An appropriate order will be entered. 
FN1. The relevant portions of the will are: 
'ARTICLE THIRD 'I give, devise and bequeath all 
the rest, residue and remainder of my Estate, real, 
personal and mixed, of whatsoever kind, nature and 
description, wheresoever situated, unto the 
SECURITY-PEOPLES TRUST COMPANY, a 
banking corporation located at Erie, Pennsylvania, 
IN TRUST, nevertheless for the use and benefit of 
the beneficiaries hereinafter named in the manner 
hereinafter designated. 'ARTICLE FOURTH 'My 
executor while in possession and control of my 
Estate, and thereafter my Trustee, is hereby 
authorized to retain, hold, possess, manage, 
control, sell, convey, encumber, lease, invest and 
reinvest, and successively invest and reinvest the 
assets thereof according to its sole judgment and 
discretion, in such securities or other property, 
personal or real, and upon such terms and for such 
length of time, as to it shall seem advisable, without 
any limitation upon its power or authority so to do, 
either by statute or otherwise. I further authorize 
my Trustee to charge all premiums on investments 
against principal, and to credit all discounts on 
investments to principal. Any and all cash 
dividends, whether ordinary or extraordinary or 
special, shall be considered as income; and any and 
all stock dividends, rights, warrants, or other things 
of value, shall be considered as corpus and added to 
the principal of the estate. Any profit realized from 
the sale of any security or investment shall be 
considered as corpus and added to the principal of 
the trust, and likewise any loss on any such sale 
shall be deducted from the principal and not from 
the income of the Trust. The Trustee, in its 
discretion, may apportion between principal and 
income any expenditure which in its opinion should 
be apportioned, notwithstanding any rule or any 
provision hereof to the contrary. Tn any case in 
which the Trustee is required to divide the principal 
of the estate in parts or shares or to distribute the 
same, it is hereby authorized and empowered in its 
sole discretion to make division or distribution in 
kind or partly in kind and party in money. The 
judgment of the Trustee concerning values for the 
purpose of such division or distribution of property 
or securities shall be binding and conclusive on all 
persons interested therein. My trustee may 
accumulate such portion of the income payable to 
any minor beneficiaries that may be entitled to 
participate hereunder as my Trustee in its discretion 
may deed (deem) advisable 'ARTICLE FIFTH 
'Section 1. In the event that my wife, EDNA 
BUHL PUTTS, is living at the time of my death, 
my Trustee shall pay the income from the Trust 
Estate in convenient installments unto her during the 
term of her natural life. 'Section 2. On the death 
of my said wife, EDNA BUHL PUTTS, or on my 
death in the event my said wife shall predecease 
me, my trustee shall pay the income from the Tj-ust 
Estate in convenient installments unto my daughter, 
CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, during the term of 
her natural life. 'Section 3. On the death of my 
daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, or in the 
event that she shall predecease me, or die before 
my wife, EDNA BUHL PUTTS, then on my death 
or the death of my said wife, EDNA BUHL 
PUTTS, which ever shall last occur, my Trustee 
shall pay the income from the Trust Estate in 
convenient installments as follows, to wit: one-half 
(1/2) thereof unto my son-in-law, HENRY W. 
BUHL, during the term of his natural life, and one-
half (1/2) thereof equally to or for the use of the 
children of my daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS 
BUHL, to wit: LOIS CHRISTENE BUHL, 
NANCY ANNE BUHL, and any other children of 
my said daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, 
that may be hereafter born or adopted until they 
respectively become forty-five (45) years of age. 
Should my son-in-law, HENRY W. BUHL, not be 
living at the time he would otherwise have been 
entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the net income 
of the Trust Estate under the foregoing provisions, 
or on his death if the same should occur subsequent 
thereto, I direct that my Trustee shall pay all of the 
income from the Trust Estate to or for the use of 
LOIS CHRISTENE BUHL, NANCY ANNE 
BUHL, and any other children of my said daughter, 
CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, that may be hereafter 
born or adopted. As the children of my daughter, 
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CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, respectively become 
forty-five (45) years of age, or, if they or either of 
them have become forty-five (45) years of age at or 
prior to the time of the happening of a contingency 
which would entitle said child or children unto one-
half (1/2) or all of the income from the Trust 
Estate, I direct that the principal of the Trust Estate 
from which said child or children would otherwise 
be entitled to receive income shall be paid over to 
said child or children free and clear of the terms 
hereof. 'Section 4. In the event that any of the 
children of my daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS 
BUHL, shall die leaving issue her surviving, either 
before or after becoming entitled to receive income 
or principal under the terms of this my Will, I give, 
devise and bequeath the shares of income and 
principal to which such decedent would have been 
entitled if living, unto her issue, per stirpes, or, if 
such decedent shall leave no issue her surviving, I 
give, devise, and bequeath her shares of income 
and principal hereunder unto the survivor or 
survivors of said children, with the surviving issue 
of any who may then be deceased taking per stirpes 
the share to which their parent would have been 
entitled if living. On becoming twenty-one (21) 
years of age, said issue of my daughter's children 
shall receive their share of principal and 
accumulated income of the Trust Estate free and 
clear of the terms hereof. 'Section 5. If the 
survivor of the children of my daughter, 
CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, and their issue shall 
die without leaving issue surviving either before or 
after becoming entitled to receive income and/or 
principal under the terms of this my Will, but prior 
to said Trust Estate being completely distributed, I 
give, devise and bequeath the portions of the Trust 
Estate from which said children or their issue would 
have been entitled to receive income or principal 
therefrom if living, as follows: to wit: Two-thirds 
(2/3) thereof unto the heirs-at-law of my wife, 
EDNA BUHL PUTTS, as determined by the 
Intestate Laws of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania existing at said time or times, and 
one-third (1/3) thereof unto my heirs-at-law as 
determined by said Laws. 'Section 6. I direct that 
the gifts of principal of the Trust Estate herein made 
shall include also accumulated income thereon; 
further, that the words, 'children and 'issue' as 
herein used shall include adopted as well as natural 
children and issue and that adopted children and 
their issue shall be entitled to participate hereunder 
to the same extent as if natural children or issue of 
the persons herein named or described. 'ARTICLE 
SIXTH T hereby authorize my Trustee to advance 
portions of the principal of the Trust Estate to or for 
the use or benefit of the following beneficiaries of 
income therefrom, to wit, my wife, EDNA BUHL 
PUTTS, my daughter, CHRISTENE PUTTS 
BUHL, and children and issue of my said daughter, 
CHRISTENE PUTTS BUHL, during the periods in 
which said beneficiaries shall be entitled to receive 
income, at such times, in such amounts, and for 
such purposes as my Trustee in its discretion may 
deem advisable. I direct that my Trustee shall 
exercise liberally the power to advance principal 
herein conferred to promote the health, comfort, 
maintenance or welfare of the income beneficiaries 
hereinabove referred to. Such principal 
advancements, when made, shall be charged to and 
deducted from any principal payment later due 
hereunder to the recipient of said advancement or to 
any person claiming under or through the same. 
Prior to such principal distribution, said 
advancements shall be chargeable against the 
portion of the Trust Estate from which the recipient 
thereof or persons thereunder claiming shall be 
entitled to receive income and shall not diminish the 
principal from which income may be due 
concurrent beneficiaries under the terms hereof. 
'ARTICLE SEVENTH 'None of the shares of 
income or principal by this instrument given to or 
directed to be held for the use and benefit of the 
several and respective beneficiaries herein 
specified, shall be in any way or manner subject or 
liable to their or any of their anticipation, sale, 
pledge, debts, contracts, engagements, or liabilities, 
and shall not be subject or liable to attachment or 
execution or sequestration under any legal or 
equitable or other process. 'ARTICLE EIGHTH 
'During the administration of my Estate my 
Executor shall disburse the income received from 
investments to the person or persons who would be 
entitled thereto if my estate were then fully 
administered, and may make expenditures for 
obligations and expenses of my estate from the 
principal assets thereof. 'ARTICLE NINTH T 
hereby nominate, constitute, and appoint the 
SECURITY-PEOPLES TRUST COMPANY, of 
Erie, Pennsylvania, as Executor of this my Last 
Will and Testament and Testamentary Guardian of 
the estates of any minors entitles to participate 
hereunder.' 
FN2. Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 
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I960); Barritt v. Tomlinson, 129 F.Supp. 642 
(S.D.Fla.1955); Snyder v. United States, 203 
F.Supp. 195 (W.D.Ky.1962); Pittsfield Nat. Bank 
v. United States, 181 F.Supp. 851 (D.Mass. 1960); 
Strite v. McGinnes, 215 F.Supp. 513 
(E.D.Pa.1963), Affd. 3 Cir., 330 F.2d 234, Cert. 
Den. 379 U.S. 836, 85 S.Ct. 69, Rehearing Denied 
379 U.S. 910, 85 S.Ct. 185 (3rd Cir. 1964). 
FN3. Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 
1960); Barritt v. Tomlinson, 129 F.Supp. 642 
(S.D.Fla.1955); Snyder v. United States, 203 
F.Supp. 195 (W.D.Ky.1962). 
FN4. Keen's Estate, 80 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 377 
(1951); Arrott's Estate, 36 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 546 
(1939); Estate of George M. Morriss, 26 
Dauph.Co. 137(1922). 
FN5. 'If the power of invasion is given to the 
trustee and not to the beneficiary, there are no 
estate or gift tax consequences to the beneficiary.' 
Lifetime and Testamentary Estate Planning in 
Pennsylvania, Edward M. Davis American Law 
Institute 1958 (p. 94). (See also 'Lifetime and 
Testamentary Estate Planning' Harrison Tweed and 
William Parsons, Am.Law Inst.) 'Therefore where 
it is intended that the principal of the trust may be 
invaded for the benefit of the income beneficiaries, 
the power to invade should be reposed in the 
discretion of those trustees who are not 
beneficiaries.' 2 Polisher, Estate Planning and 
Estate Tax Saving, p. 494. '* * * it is clear that 
giving the wife power over her husband's property 
will often result in income, gift and estate tax 
problems for her. Clearly, the surest way to avoid 
such problems is to name some other person trustee 
and to give the widow no powers over the 
husband's property.' Andrew H. Cox 'Income and 
Estate Tax Aspects of Surviving Spouse Beneficiary 
Serving as Executor-Trustee.'; 22 Institute on 
Federal Taxation (p. 1041) New York University 
1964. See also 'Trusts in Estate Planning' by 
Sidney C. Winton, and Sherwin Kamin in Lasser 
'Estate Tax Techniques.' Vol. 2, p. 1300. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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NCNB NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA tl 
k/a The Exchange National Bank of 
Tampa, as 
Trustee of the Florence E. Hoard Trust, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Richard L. SHANABERGER, as Guardian 
of the Property of Mark E. Shanaberger, 
incapacitated, Appellee. 
No. 92-01226. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Second District. 
March 19, 1993. 
Son and guardian of income beneficiary 
requested that trustee invade principal of 
trust for payment of income beneficiary's 
nursing home expenses and related charges. 
Trustee requested information of beneficiary's 
outside sources of income prior to granting the 
beneficiary's principal invasion demand. The 
Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Frank H. 
White, J., entered declaratory judgment in 
determining that trustee had abused its 
discretion, and trustee appealed. The District 
Court of Appeal, Ryder, Acting C. J., held that 
trustee did not abuse its discretion in 
requesting information of income beneficiary's 
outside sources of income prior to satisfying 
the beneficiary's trust invasion demand for his 
nursing home and related medical expenses. 
Reversed and remanded. 
[1] TRUSTS <&= 111 
390kl77 
Trustee's exercise of its discretion is not 
subject to control by court except to prevent an 
abuse of discretion. 
[21 TRUSTS <S^ 177 
390kl77 
Trustee is always subject to accountability to 
remaindermen where discretion is improperly, 
arbitrarily or capriciously exercised. 
[3] TRUSTS &* 276 
390k276 
Even an unlimited power of invasion of a trust 
is subject to implied limitations to protect the 
remaindermen. 
[41 TRUSTS <&* 276 
390k276 
Trustee did not abuse its discretion in 
requesting information of income beneficiary's 
outside sources of income prior to satisfying 
the beneficiary's trust invasion demand for his 
nursing home and related medical expenses; 
there was no evidence that the trustee acted 
dishonestly, arbitrarily or from improper 
motive. 
*96 Stacy D. Blank and Steven L. Brannock 
of Holland & Knight, Tampa, for appellant. 
Mark I. Shames, St. Petersburg, for 
appellee. 
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. 
NCNB National Bank of Florida, as Trustee 
of the Florence E. Hoard Trust, *97 disputes 
the trial court's declaratory judgment 
determining that the trustee had abused its 
discretion by requiring information as to other 
sources of income from Mark E. Shanaberger, 
Sr. prior to satisfying his trust principal 
invasion demand for his nursing home and 
related medical expense. Because we hold 
that the trustee must under these 
circumstances look to outside resources to 
evaluate in its sole discretion what is 
"necessary" in order to invade the principal, 
we reverse. 
NCNB is the trustee of the Florence E. 
Hoard Trust which names Mark E. 
Shanaberger, Sr. as the income beneficiary 
and directs the trustee to pay the trust's 
income to him for his life. The trust further 
provides that upon the income beneficiary's 
death, two remainder trusts are to be created 
for the benefit of Hoard's nieces. Like the 
income beneficiary, the nieces are to receive 
the trust income until their deaths, after 
which the trust principal is to be distributed to 
their surviving children. 
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Under the trust, NCNB's obligation to pay 
the income of the trust to Mark is mandatory, 
not discretionary. The trust also provides that 
the trustee "may invade the principal of the 
trust estate and pay from the said principal so 
much of it as in the sole discretion of the 
Trustee is necessary for the care, 
maintenance, support and medical attention" 
of Mark Shanaberger. The trust further 
allows that principal invasions may be made 
by the trustee in its sole discretion. The trust, 
however, set no criteria in making the 
necessity determination. But the trust 
prohibits the trustee from paying any amounts 
for the maintenance, support or care of any 
heirs or dependents of Mark Shanaberger. 
The parties stipulated that the settlor, 
Florence Hoard, and Mark Shanaberger had a 
close, personal relationship that began in the 
early 1940,s. At all times relevant to the 
execution of the Hoard trusts, amendments, 
wills and codicil, both parties had full 
knowledge of each other's respective financial 
situation, and, as part of that knowledge, 
Hoard knew that Shanaberger's assets and 
income at that time exceeded her own and 
were sufficient to meet any of his anticipated 
medical costs and expenses without 
contribution from her trust funds. The parties 
also stipulated that due to his age and 
condition, Mark Shanaberger required nursing 
home care and has resided in a nursing home 
in Pennsylvania since June 1989. 
In July 1989, Richard E. Shanaberger, the 
son and guardian of Mark Shanaberger, 
requested NCNB to invade the principal of the 
trust for the payment of the senior 
Shanaberger's nursing home expenses and 
related charges. The expenses averaged 
$3,100.00 each month. The initial request 
was for a principal invasion in the amount of 
$6,245.27. At that time, the entire principal 
of the trust was approximately $120,000.00. 
NCNB concluded that it could unconditionally 
invade the trust principal in the amount of 
$2,500.00, but it was concerned that repeated 
requests to invade principal for the payment of 
Shanaberger's nursing home expenses would 
deplete the trust. Before invading principal to 
any greater extent, NCNB requested 
information regarding Mark Shanaberger's 
other sources of income in an effort to 
reasonably evaluate whether the invasion was 
necessary for his care. 
Richard Shanaberger refused to provide that 
information and initiated this litigation, 
claiming that NCNB abused its discretion by 
requesting information regarding outside 
sources of income prior to satisfying his 
invasion request in full. At trial, it was 
disclosed that information of outside sources of 
income was within Richard Shanaberger's 
knowledge. After the trial court's ruling, 
Richard Shanaberger served an additional 
demand on NCNB for $64,425.13. This timely 
appeal ensued. 
The sole issue presented to this court is 
whether the trustee's request for information 
of outside sources of income was an abuse of 
discretion. Whether, after considering such 
information, the trustee abuses its discretion 
in later approving or denying a trust principal 
invasion is not before the court. Because we 
need not consider now the settlor's intent 
concerning principal invasions, we review only 
the trustee's scope of discretion. 
[1][2][3] A trustee's exercise of its discretion 
is not subject to control by the court *98 
except to prevent an abuse of discretion. 
Sarasota Bank & Trust Co. v. Rietz, 297 So.2d 
91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). A trustee is always 
subject to accountability to remaindermen 
where discretion is improperly, arbitrarily or 
capriciously exercised. Mesler v. Holly, 318 
So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Even an 
unlimited power of invasion is subject to 
implied limitations to protect the 
remaindermen. Mesler. 
[4] NCNB has never denied the principal 
invasion request, but only determined in its 
sole discretion that it could unconditionally 
distribute only the sum of $2,500.00. The 
trustee concluded that any additional 
principal invasion would require consideration 
of the income beneficiary's other sources of 
income to make an informed decision whether 
it was necessary for his care, maintenance and 
medical attention. Our review of the record 
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discloses no evidence that the trustee acted 
dishonestly, arbitrarily or from an improper 
motive. Absent other criteria upon which to 
base a decision that a principal invasion is 
necessary, we hold that the trustee's request 
was reasonable. For the foregoing reasons, we 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
FRANK and PARKER, JJ., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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In the Matter of the Construction of the 
WILL of Jacob FLYER, Deceased. 
Phyllis KAVETT, as Trustee, et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Jeannette G. LEAVITT, as Committee of 
the Incompetent, Elsie Flyer, et al., 
Respondents. 
Court of Appeals of New York. 
Jan. 23,1969. 
Proceeding to construe will with respect to 
power of trustee to invade principal. The 
Surrogate's Court of Bronx County, 
Christopher C. McGrath, S., entered decree 
requiring trustee to invade corpus for benefit 
of incompetent widow without regard to her 
private resources and an appeal was taken. 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
in the First Judicial Department, 29 A.D.2d 8, 
284 N.Y.S.2d 891, affirmed by a divided court 
and there was an appeal. The Court of 
Appeals, Fuld, C.J., held that upon 
considering surrounding circumstances and 
reading as a whole will which testator had 
executed after his wife had become incurably 
ill and after he had used her social security 
payments for her support, trustee who was 
given an absolute discretion to invade 
principal for benefit of wife if income were 
insufficient for wife's support was privileged 
to consider beneficiary's independent 
resources including social security benefits 
before deciding to invade principal. 
Order appealed from reversed and matter 
remitted for further proceedings. 
Scileppi andBreitel, JJ., dissented. 
[11 WILLS <^ 684.2(5) 
409k684.2(5) 
In determining whether trustee is privileged 
to consider beneficiary's independent income 
before effecting an invasion of principal the 
language of will may not be entirely 
disregarded but, as in every case in which a 
will is ambiguous or silent with respect to a 
controverted matter, it is testator's intent 
Copr. ® West 1995 No claim 
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which must control, and court educes his 
design not only from language employed but 
from sympathetic reading of will as an 
entirety while considering circumstances 
under which provisions were framed. 
[2] WILLS <S=* 684.10(5) 
409k684.10(5) 
Trustee, particularly when given uncontrolled 
discretion to invade principal, may before 
deciding to effect an invasion, take into 
account beneficiary's independent resources 
where there is no absolute gift of principal and 
testator intends that invasion of principal be 
dependent upon needs or requirements of the 
beneficiary. 
[3] WILLS <§^ 684.2(5) 
409k684.2(5) 
Trustee may not consider beneficiary's income 
before deciding to effect an invasion of 
principal where testator attached no condition 
of need and intended that gift of principal be 
as broad as gift of interest and the first 
inseparable from the other. 
[4] WILLS <&> 684.10(5) 
409k684.10(5) 
Upon considering surrounding circumstances 
and reading as a whole will which testator had 
executed after his wife had become incurably 
ill and after he had used her social security 
payments for her support, trustee who was 
given an absolute discretion to invade 
principal for benefit of wife if income were 
insufficient for wife's support was privileged 
to consider beneficiary's independent 
resources including social security benefits 
before deciding to invade principal. 
***957 **718 *580 Herbert Monte Levy, 
New York City, for appellants. 
*581 Richard E. Leavitt, Brooklyn, for 
Jeannette G. Leavitt, respondent. 
•582FULD, Chief Judge. 
In this proceeding to construe a will, we are 
presented with the question whether a **719 
trustee, vested with sole and absolute 
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discretion to invade the principal of the trust 
for the support of the life beneficiary, may 
take the latter's private resources into account 
before deciding to effect an invasion. 
The testator, Jacob Flyer, died in August of 
1964. He was survived by three daughters of 
a deceased first wife and by a second spouse, 
Elsie, whom he had married in 1945. In 1960, 
the latter suffered a severe stroke which left 
her a hopeless and incurable invalid. Soon 
thereafter, the testator executed his will 
giving two thirds of his estate outright--or his 
entire estate if his wife predeceased him-to 
his three children in ***958 equal shares. 
Out of the last third, 'or the sum of $20,000, 
whichever is greater,' he created a trust for 
his widow, with the remainder to be equally 
divided at her death among the three 
daughters. The estate was valued at over 
$50,000. 
The particular clause which prompted the 
present construction proceeding, after reciting 
that one third of the testator's estate was to be 
given in trust to one of his daughters as 
trustee 'to pay to (his) wife Elsie or her 
representative, or to use for (her) benefit * * * 
the income thereof for (her) life', went on to 
provide that, 
'if such income be insufficient for the 
support and maintenance of Elsie, my 
Trustee shall so pay or use from principal 
sufficient moneys to provide for Elsie's 
support and maintenance, in the sole, 
absolute and uncontrolled discretion of the 
Trustee. If, in the sole, absolute and 
uncontrolled discretion of the Trustee, any 
part of the net income thereof need not be 
used for the support and maintenance of my 
said wife, such part of the income shall be 
added to and become part of the principal of 
the trust estate.'[FNl] 
FN1 If any daughter died before the widow, the 
testator provided, that daughter's share was to be 
held in trust for her children until they reached the 
age of 21 and, again, the trustee was given 'sole, 
uncontrolled and absolute discretion' to invade the 
principal for their benefit or to add to it any income 
which remained unused. 
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*583 The testator's wife spent virtually the 
entire four-year period, between the execution 
of the will by her husband and his death, in 
hospitals and nursing homes and was finally 
confined to Pilgrim State Hospital after she 
had attempted suicide. She has a sister-who 
was appointed her committee in 1965--and a 
daughter by a previous marriage. Her assets, 
in addition to the trust set up for her benefit, 
consist of cash and personal property, worth 
about $10,000, and income from social security 
payments amounting to about $1,800 a year. 
There is due and unpaid a hospital bill of 
more than $10,000. The petitioner in this 
construction proceeding--the incompetent's 
sister who, as noted, is her committee-
contends that the testator 'intended' an 
absolute gift of both income and principal to 
his widow, without regard to her independent 
resources, and that, accordingly, the trustee 
should be required to pay that bill as well as 
any others which may be incurred. The 
trustee, one of the testator's daughters, finds 
no such requirement in the will. It is her 
position that her father, though desiring to 
provide for his widow's maintenance out of 
principal in case of necessity, intended her 
private income to be used and, in support of 
this claim, calls attention to the fact that the 
testator had actually used his wife's social 
security moneys in paying her hospital bills 
during his lifetime. 
The Surrogate agreed with the petitioner, 
concluding that the trustee was required to 
pay all amounts necessary for the widow's 
support and ***959 maintenance out of both 
principal and income 'without regard to (her) 
private resources'. A closely divided 
Appellate Division affirmed. The minority 
took the view that it was clear from the will, 
as well as from the circumstances existing 
between the time of its execution **720 and 
the testator's death, that he intended his 
widow's independent income to be applied 
toward her support. If the result be otherwise, 
Justice McGivern pointed out in his dissenting 
opinion, 
'The corpus will be eroded--for as it 
decreases, its yield will correspondingly 
diminish, to the point of destruction, if the 
» orig. U.S. govt, works ^ " " 
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widow lives long enough. And an injury is 
wrought to the children of the testator. All 
the while, the social security payments of 
the widow here will batten and pointlessly 
accumulate. Social security was devised to 
allay the fears and mitigate the *584 
privations of old age, not to multiply for 
some one else, other than the subject, to 
enjoy.' (29 A.D.2d 8, 11, 284 N.Y.S.2d 891, 
894.) 
We agree with the dissenting justices of the 
Appellate Division that the present case falls 
within the decisions holding that a trustee is 
privileged to consider the beneficiary's 
independent income before effecting an 
invasion of principal. 
[1] Although the decisions in this area of the 
law place emphasis on the precise verbiage 
found in the provision creating the trust, close 
analysis reveals that they take into 
consideration more than such verbiage alone 
in seeking to ascertain the testator's intent. 
The language may not, of course, be entirely 
disregarded but, as in every case in which a 
will is ambiguous or silent with respect to a 
controverted matter, it is the testator's intent 
which must control, and we educe his design 
not only from the language employed but from 
a 'sympathetic reading of the will as an 
entirety and in view of all the facts and 
circumstances under which (its) provisions * * 
* were framed.' (Matter of Fabri's Will, 2 
N.Y.2d 236, 240, 159 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187, 140 
N.E.2d 269, 271; see, also, Matter of Clark's 
Will, 280 N.Y. 155, 160, 19 N.E.2d 1001, 
1003.) 
[2][3] The principle which emerges from the 
cases may be briefly stated. A trustee, 
particularly when given uncontrolled 
discretion to invade principal (see, e.g., Matter 
of Bisconti's Will, 306 N.Y. 442, 446, 119 
N.E.2d 34, 36; Matter of Messer's Will, 34 
Misc.2d 416, 420, 231 N.Y.S.2d 201, 205), 
may, before deciding to effect an invasion, 
take into account the beneficiary's 
independent resources where there is no 
'absolute' gift of principal, the prime gift 
being that of income, and the testator 
Intended that the 'invasion of the principal * * 
* (be) dependent upon the needs or 
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requirements of the beneficiary.' (Matter of 
Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 312, 199 N.E. 
491, 493; see, also, ***960 Matter of Garrett's 
Will, 9 A.D.2d 545, 190 N.Y.S.2d 758, affd. 8 
N.Y.2d 725, 201 N.Y.S.2d 102, 167 N.E.2d 
644; Matter of Hogeboom's Will, 219 App.Div. 
131, 219 N.Y.S. 436; Marrer of Messer's Will, 
34 Misc.2d 416, 231 N.Y.S.2d 201, Supra.) The 
rule is, however, different-that is, the trustee 
may not consider the beneficiary's income-
where the testator attached no condition of 
need and Intended that 'The gift of principal 
(be) as broad as the gift of interest' and the 
first inseparable from the other. (Matter of 
Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 310, 199 N.E. 
491, 493, Supra; see, also, Matter of Clark's 
Will, 280 N.Y. 155, 19 N.E.2d 1001, Supra; 
Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 
237; Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 
960.) 
[4] In the case before us, as already noted, 
the trustee was given an absolute discretion to 
invade principal if the income were *585 
'insufficient' for the wife's support. Silent 
though the will itself is as to whether her own 
income was to be considered, study of the 
testament as a whole, in the light of the 
attendant circumstances, makes it plain 
beyond doubt that, although the testator 
wished to provide for his wife during her 
lifetime, his paramount concern was for his 
daughters and their children and his desire 
was to preserve his estate for them. 
Turning, first, to the testator's will, it is 
instinct with his affection and concern for 
**721 his descendants. He left his total estate 
to his three daughters in equal shares if his 
wife predeceased him. Any income from the 
trust which she did not need for her support 
was to be added to the principal which they 
were to inherit. In the event of a daughter's 
predeceasing his wife, he made elaborate 
provision for gifts over to his grandchildren. 
Inclusion of the latter provision goes far 
toward establishing that he did not envisage a 
possible exhaustion of the trust corpus--a 
result which might ensue if the principal is to 
be invaded without regard to his wife's own 
income. 
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As for the situation existing at the time he 
made his will-which continued until his 
death--the testator's wife was incurably ill. 
The trust which he created for her benefit was 
designed to assure her an income which would 
take care of her probable needs if, and only if, 
her social security payments were also applied 
to her support. In point of fact, he had 
actually used those payments for that purpose 
while he was alive, and there is no reason to 
believe that he wished that practice to be 
discontinued after he died. He certainly did 
not intend the social security payments of his 
hopelessly ill and incompetent wife to 
accumulate for her heirs and permit the trust 
principal, which he wished to preserve for his 
own issue, to be diminished and, perhaps, 
consumed. 
As already appears from our treatment of 
the cases, the decisions relied upon by the 
petitioner (see Matter of Clark's Will, 280 
N.Y. 155, ***961 19 N.E.2d 1001, Supra; 
Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 
237, Supra; Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471, 
22 N.E. 960, Supra) are inapposite. The court 
in those cases concluded, not on the basis of 
the trust language alone, but on the strength 
of the will as a whole and other relevant 
factors, that a gift of principal was intended 
and that the testator's almost exclusive 
interest was in the beneficiary, the 
remaindermen occupying a completely 
subsidiary position. *586 On the other hand, 
as we have seen, the present testator made it 
quite plain that his children were his primary 
concern and any provision for his wife from 
trust principal, as opposed to income, was 
clearly secondary. 
It follows from what we have said that in the 
present case the trustee was privileged to take 
the beneficiary's independent income into 
account before invading principal. 
The order appealed from should be reversed 
and the matter remitted to the Surrogate's 
Court for further proceedings in accordance 
with this opinion, with costs to all parties 
appearing separately and filing separate briefs 
payable out of the estate. 
SCILEPPI, Judge (dissenting). 
I dissent and vote to affirm. 
In my view, the result reached by the 
majority is not only contrary to well-settled 
law, but completely disregards the plain 
language of the will. 
It is axiomatic that the courts do not have 
the power--nor is it their function-to remake 
the will of a testator. Thus, if the language 
used in the will is clear, precise and 
unambiguous, there is no problem of 
construction; rather, there is an obligation of 
enforcement. 
As this court stated in Matter of Bisconti's 
Will, 306 N.Y. 442, 445, 119 N.E.2d 34, 35 
'The application of the rules of construction of 
wills is for the purpose of determining the 
intent of the testator where that intent is not 
clearly expressed by the testamentary words, 
and the rules of construction are to be 
disregarded when the language is clear and 
definite. It is well established that rules of 
construction are merely subsidiary aids. 
Matter of Watson's Will, 262 N.Y. 284, 293, 
294, 186 N.E. 787, 788, 789. If intention of a 
will-maker is to be found in the words used in 
the will and these are clear and definite there 
is no power to change them. Matter of 
Watson's Will, Supra. As is stated in Davids 
on the New York Law of Wills: 'When 
intention can be ascertained as a fact from 
**722 the instrument itself * * * there is no 
occasion for a presumption in respect thereof, 
and the decision should not be affected by the 
rules in question. Hence the rules of 
construction are to be disregarded where the 
decedent's intention is clearly or sufficiently 
manifest, or where the language of the 
instrument is plain and its meaning ***962 
obvious.' Vol. I, s 491, p. 805; see Matter of 
Rollins' Will, 271 App.Div. 982, 68 N.Y.S.2d 
116, affd. 297 N.Y. 612, 75 N.E.2d 627.' 
*587 The clause in question on this appeal is 
clear and unequivocal. It establishes a trust, 
the income of which is to be paid for life to the 
testator's incompetent widow, and then 
provides that, 'if such income be insufficient 
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for the support and maintenance of (my wife), 
my Trustee shall so pay or use from principal 
sufficient moneys to provide for (my wife's) 
support and maintenance, in the sole, absolute 
and uncontrolled discretion of the Trustee'. 
This language clearly makes the gift of 
principal as broad as the gift of interest. The 
gift of principal is not conditioned upon the 
particular needs of the widow but rather upon 
the insufficiency of the income to provide 
support and maintenance. In such a situation, 
the private income of the beneficiary cannot 
be considered. The applicable rule was 
succinctly stated by this court in Matter of 
Martin's Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 312, 199 N.E. 
491, 495: 'The primary question in this class 
of cases always is, does the will constitute an 
absolute gift of support and maintenance 
which it makes a charge upon the income from 
the estate and upon principal? If, so, then the 
private income of the beneficiary cannot be 
considered. If, however, the gift is of income 
coupled with a provision that the principal 
may be invaded in case of need, the private 
income of the beneficiary must be considered 
in determining whether such need exists.' 
In Martin, the court held that the private 
income of the beneficiary was to be considered 
in determining whether to invade principal. 
But, there, unlike the present case, the will 
provided for the invasion of principal 'as (the 
beneficiary) may require for her care, support 
and comfort, during her natural life'. 
In almost every case where the will in 
question provided for the invasion of principal, 
if the income from the trust was Insufficient or 
in cases where the trust provided for the use of 
income and so much of principal 'as may be 
necessary' with no limitation of the amount of 
principal which may be invaded, the courts of 
this State have uniformly found that such 
language constituted an absolute gift of 
support and maintenance without regard to 
the private income of the beneficiary. 
Contrary to the assertion of the majority 
herein, the case of Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 
N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 237, is directly in point. 
In that case, as in this one, the committee of 
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an adjudged incompetent alleged that it was 
the duty of the trustee to pay for the *588 
support and maintenance of the incompetent 
out of the income and principal of the trust 
which had been created by the will of the 
incompetent's mother. At the time that the 
testatrix executed her will she was aware that 
her son owned certain valuable property and 
was in receipt of an income from ***963 the 
estate of his father. As in the instant case, the 
trustee in Rezzemini represented the vested 
remaindermen and claimed that the 
incompetent's income from all other sources 
must be exhausted before any invasion of 
principal was warranted. 
In construing the clause in question, which 
reads as follows: 'If the income from my estate 
shall be insufficient for the proper support of 
my said son, then in that event, I authorize 
and empower my said trustee to expend so 
much of the principal thereof as may be 
necessary for that purpose', this court held: 
'Our decision in the case of Holden v. Strong, 
116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 960, involved the 
construction of a will wherein the testator 
gave to a trustee 'full power and authority to 
use so much **723 of the trust fund, either 
interest or principal, as shall, in his judgment 
and discretion, be necessary for the proper 
care, comfort and maintenance' of the plaintiff 
so long as he should live. We held that the 
plaintiff there was entitled to support and 
maintenance even though he was able to 
support himself and had accumulated a fund 
which he had on deposit in a bank. The 
reasoning and principal laid down in that case 
we regard as controlling the case under 
consideration.' (Rezzemini v. Brooks, Supra, 
p. 193,140 N.E. p. 240.) 
In other words, since the language of the 
clause-which is almost identical to language 
of the clause now before us-clearly 
conditioned the gift from principal solely upon 
the insufficiency of the income to provide for 
care and support and not upon the necessity of 
the beneficiary, it was held that the private 
income of the beneficiary could not be 
considered. 
Matter of Clark's Will, 280 N.Y. 155, 19 
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N.E.2d 1001, is another case in point. In 
Clark (pp. 158-159, 19 N.E.2d p. 1002) the 
testator established a life trust for his widow 
and then provided: 'In the event that the 
income provided for my said wife under 
paragraph 'Fourth' above shall, in the 
judgment of my trustee, be insufficient for her 
every comfort and support, I authorize may 
said trustee to pay to her, in addition to 
income, such portion of the principal of the 
said trust as it shall from time to time deem 
necessary.' 
*589 In a proceeding for the settlement of 
the accounts of the trustee, an objection was 
made to the allowance of an amount paid out 
of principal for the benefit of the widow. This 
court held: 
'The provisions of the will are not 
ambiguous, the intent of the testator is clear 
from the face of the instrument, and we may 
determine for ourselves what the instrument 
itself contains. Ascertainment of the intent of 
the testator as shown by his will, taken as a 
whole, is our primary purpose, and, when 
ascertained, is to prevail over all other canons 
of construction. Matter of James, 146 N.Y. 78, 
100, 40 N.E. 876; Matter ***964 of Buechner, 
226 N.Y. 440, 123 N.E. 741. The will clearly 
provides for payment by the trustee in 
quarterly installments of the entire income 
from the trust and of so much of the principal 
in addition thereto as, in the sole judgment of 
the trustee, shall by it be deemed necessary 
for every comfort and support of the widow. 
'In conformity to that purpose and intent, 
the trustee is required to furnish every 
comfort and support for the widow which it 
may deem in a sound discretion necessary out 
of income and, if required, out of the corpus, 
even to the extent of exhausting the entire 
corpus of the trust, without taking into 
consideration or account the personal income 
of the beneficiary from any other source. 
Holden v. Strong, 116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 960; 
Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 
237. What is necessary for the purpose is 
limited only by the amount of the income and 
the corpus of the trust. Whatever income the 
beneficiary may have from sources other than 
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the trust is of no concern to the trustee in 
forming its judgment as to the amount 
necessary for her every comfort and support. 
The testator did not contemplate that his 
widow should be required to use her own 
personal income or to incur individual 
obligations for her comfort and support as long 
as there was anything in the trust that might, 
in the sound discretion of the trustee, be used 
for that purpose.' (Matter of Clark's Will, 
Supra, pp. 160-161,19 N.E.2dp. 1003.) 
Matter of Johnson's Estate, 46 Misc.2d 52, 
258 N.Y.S.2d 922, also involved a proceeding 
concerning an incompetent. In that case the 
will provided (p. 54, 258 N.Y.S.2d p. 924): 'If, 
at any time, in their sole and unrestricted 
judgment and discretion, my Trustees shall 
determine that the income from said trust 
shall not be adequate for the comfortable 
support *590 and maintenance of my said 
wife, then and in that event, I authorize and 
empower my **724 Trustees, from time to 
time, to encroach upon the principal of said 
trust fund and pay therefrom to, or for the 
benefit of, my said wife, such portion of the 
principal of said trust as, in their sole and 
unrestricted judgment and discretion, my 
Trustees may deem necessary and proper for 
the comfortable support and maintenance of 
my wife'. 
In construing this provision of the will, the 
Surrogate found as follows (p. 56, 258 
N.Y.S.2d p. 927): 'When the language of 
earlier cases, beginning with Holden v. 
Strong, 116 N.Y. 471, 22 N.E. 960 (1889), 
Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N.Y. 184, 140 N.E. 
237 (1923), and that of Matter of Martin's Will 
(supra), and Matter of Clark's Will (supra) is 
compared with the language above quoted in 
Paragraph 'FIFTH (2)' of the will of decedent, 
it appears to this court that the decedent 
intended to make an absolute gift of support 
and maintenance, ***965 which was a charge 
upon income and principal, and the Court so 
decides. Therefore, the private income of the 
beneficiary cannot be considered in 
determining how much principal should be 
paid to the beneficiary.' 
The Surrogate then went on to hold that the 
to orig. U.S. govt, works ^ " 
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(Cite as: 23 N.Y.2d 579, *590, 
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test for invasion of principal is solely whether 
the income is sufficient for support, and not 
whether the beneficiary needs the principal. 
In Matter of GrubeFs Will, 37 Misc.2d 910, 
235 N.Y.S.2d 21, the court was faced with a 
will which also provide, as in the case at bar, 
that in the event that the trustees shall find 
that the net income obtainable from a trust set 
up for the decedent's wife 'will provide 
insufficient for the needs of my beloved wife' 
then the trustees were authorized to withdraw 
from the corpus whatever sums may be 
necessary to enable the wife to live in a proper 
manner. The Surrogate held that the trust 
provisions constituted an absolute gift of 
support and that the other resources of the 
beneficiary were not relevant. 
In Matter of Leahy's Estate, Sur., 56 
N.Y.S.2d 555, the court was faced with a claim 
for funds by the State Department of Hospitals 
where the income beneficiary had been 
confined in a mental hospital. In finding an 
absolute gift of income and principal, the court 
held (p. 556): 'Only as to invasion of principal 
did the testator leave anything to the 
'discretion' of the trustees. The will provides 
liberally that if the income should ever 
become *591 insufficient for the comfortable 
maintenance of the beneficiary in accordance 
with her accustomed mode of living, then 
there is given to the trustees the 'power to 
advance to her, or to pay for her benefit, any 
additional sum from the principal of said trust 
fund as they in their discretion deem 
necessary.' This discretion goes only to the 
amount of the invasion at any time. There is 
not any power given to decide whether or not 
there shall be any payment made at all.' (See, 
e.g., Matter of Van Gaalen's Estate, 38 
Misc.2d 853, 239 N.Y.S. 312; Matter of 
Connors' Estate, 34 Misc.2d 1043, 225 
N.Y.S.2d 949; Matter of Vaturi's Estate, 33 
Misc.2d 295, 223 N.Y.S.2d 931; Matter of 
Paster's Estate, 22 Misc.2d 4, 198 N.Y.S.2d 
441.) 
It would appear from a review of the cases in 
this area that the language used in the instant 
will has acquired through judicial decision, a 
definite and established significance. And, as 
the author of the majority opinion herein 
observed in his dissent in Matter of 
Gulbenkian's Will, 9 N.Y.2d 363, 372-373, 
214 N.Y.S.2d 379, 384, 174 N.E.2d 481, 485: 
'when a will contains language which has 
acquired, through judicial decision, a definite 
and established significance, the testator is 
taken to have employed the language in that 
sense and with that meaning in mind. (See 
Matter of Krooss, 302 N.Y. 424, 428, 99 
N.E.2d 222 (47 A.L.R.2d 894).' 
***966 I agree with the courts below that 
the testator's primary intention was to 
bequeath the income and principal of the trust 
for the support and maintenance of **725 his 
widow without regard to her personal income. 
While it is obvious that testator was concerned 
with ilio welfare of his children and 
grandchildren, it is equally obvious, especially 
since testator was aware of his wife's 
permanent incapacity and of her private 
resources, that her maintenance and support 
was his primary consideration. If he had 
intended the result reached by the majority, 
he could easily have made provision for his 
wife based upon need. This, however, he did 
not do. Having provided that if income would 
be insufficient to provide for the wife, that the 
trust be invaded, this court should not now 
remake the will, even though the result may 
be the depletion of the contingent estate of the 
children and of the infant contingent 
remaindermen. 
Accordingly, I wo mid affirm. 
BURKE, BERGAN, KEATING and JASEN, 
JJ., concur with FULD, J. 
SCILEPPI, J., dissents and votes to affirm in 
a separate opinion in which BREITEL, J., 
concurs. 
Order reversed, etc. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. '° West hnlh No i hum (o in i(' IIS \ u\ m M MI I< 
